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This thesis proposes that it is possible to extract and analyse artefacts of potential 
evidential interest from host systems where miniature computing environments have 
been run from USB connectable devices. The research focuses on Windows systems 
and includes a comparison of the results obtained following traditional ‘static’ forensic 
data collection after conducting a range of user initiated activities.  Four software 
products were evaluated during this research cycle, all of which could be used as anti-
forensic tools - associated advertising claims that use of the software will either leave 
‘no trace’ of user activity or no ‘personal data’ on a host system. 
It is shown that the USB-bound environments reviewed create numerous artefacts in 
both live and unallocated space on Windows hosts which will remain available to the 
digital forensic examiner after system halt.  These include multiple references to 
identified software and related processes as well as user activity in Registry keys and 
elsewhere. Artefacts related to program use and data movements will also be retained 
in live memory (RAM) and it is recommended that this is captured and analysed.  
Where this is not possible, relevant information originally held in RAM may be 
written to disk on system shut down and hibernation, opening further opportunities to 
the analyst. 
 
This study builds on existing knowledge within digital forensic science and expands it 
in three ways.  Firstly, it presents and explains a previously overlooked artefact which 
aids investigations involving the unauthorized use of both connected and connectable 
devices on Windows hosts.  Secondly, it explores how portable virtualisation software 
interacts with host systems  - a relatively unchartered field of enquiry.  Finally, it 
informs research into antiforensics by showing that, despite its ability to cover and 
wipe its tracks, portable virtualisation software does leave traces of user-related 
activity on host systems which can greatly assist a digital forensic enquiry.  By means 
of the methodology set out in this thesis, it is possible to uncover these traces in RAM 
dumps and by conducting a targeted analysis of static hard drives.  
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This chapter covers: 
 
• USB memory sticks and virtualisation: data security issues 
• An outline of the thesis 
• The scope of study 
• Research aims and objectives 
1.1  Overview 
 
Running a functioning computer environment from a memory stick has become more 
and more viable thanks to developments in desktop virtualisation technologies over 
the past decade.  Although the computer environments concerned usually provide only 
a sub-set of the features which users would expect to have access to when working on 
desktop or laptop computers, they nevertheless allow for every-day activities to be 
carried out.  These include playing games, making, moving and copying files and 
accessing the Internet.  As well as portability, a number of these miniature systems – 
which will be termed vPCs (Virtual PCs) here – are said in advertising literature to 
offer the user strong confidentiality.  Some manufacturers claim that use of their vPC 
system will leave no trace of activity at all on the host machine involved (Ceedo 
Technologies Ltd, 2014, MojoPac, 2009).  Others state that no ‘personal data’ will be 
left behind following vPC use (Lupo PenSuite 2013, Portable Apps, 2014).  These 
messages imply that secrecy as well as security is ensured.   
 
Maintaining personal privacy is an important issue from an individual’s point of view; 
maintaining data security is equally important to companies.  The proponents of vPC 
technologies are naturally keen to show how virtualised computing environments 
address both concerns.  From an information security perspective, however, they could 
be viewed as a new threat, expanding the risk of data loss or network corruption 
already posed by the use of USB memory sticks in general (Tetmeyer 2010, Goucher, 
2008) and modern ways of working such as BYOD (Garrity and Weir, 2010).  For the 
digital forensic analyst, the use of vPCs presents a different challenge – one which this 
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thesis suggests is similar to that encountered when dealing with data wiping and 
encryption.  In the hands of a wrongdoer, a vPC could become an antiforensics tool, its 
functionality being subverted in order to evade detection when carrying out 
unauthorised or potentially criminal activities.  While evidence can be deliberately 
hidden or destroyed, however, traces of those actions can usually be found and can be 
beneficial to a digital forensic enquiry (Carlton and Kessler, 2013, Moe, Thorkildsen 
and Arnes, 2009).  This research seeks to show that the same can be true for vPCs and 
that worthwhile investigative results may be obtained using standard examination 
techniques.  More detailed results may be acquired by using advanced techniques such 
as live memory capture and analysis and preliminary research into this aspect of 
enquiry is explored in this thesis.  
1.2 The problem area 
 
The problem area identified in this research arises where two distinct technologies 
meet.  The first technology is the USB connectable device, a piece of hardware, the 
second is virtualisation, which is software. The hardware is cheap, ubiquitous and 
extremely portable, the software is either free or very cheap and readily available for 
download from the Internet.  The use of either of these technologies in isolation can 
impact on the security of host computer systems, as will be discussed.  The use of both 
in combination, it is suggested, raises the bar for professionals involved in either 
preserving data integrity or investigating data security breaches. 
 
The uncontrolled connection of USB devices to computer systems is widely 
acknowledged as a serious security threat (DiRenzo, 2012; Pham et al.,2010). USB 
connectable memory sticks –also known as thumb drives or keys – present a particular 
risk, both to sensitive data and the systems used to serve and store them. Small, low-
cost and obtainable, they open up opportunities for both the theft and casual loss of 
valuable information. Viruses and other malicious software can also be introduced to 
stand-alone or networked computer systems via USB, whether deliberately or 
inadvertently (DiRenzo, 2012; Sharma, 2011). From the perspective of digital forensic 
analysis, there is a danger that antiforensic programs can be run direct from a USB key, 
helping wrongdoers to cover up or completely wipe out any traces of their activities 
(Thomas and Morris, 2008). 
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For all the above reasons, the analysis of artefacts left behind by the use of USB 
connectable devices has become an integral part of computer investigations in 
corporate and criminal cases.  As technology advances and the storage capacity of 
USB memory sticks grows - the highest capacity USB3 stick currently1 available 
offers a full terabyte of usable space - the security problems associated with them 
increase.  A miniature computer environment can be run from a USB stick with as 
little as 4 GB onboard memory, for example.  In today’s market place, 32 GB capacity 
sticks are commonplace and cost as little as £12.  These high capacity devices are also 
capable of delivering high read/write speeds, allowing users to quickly access and 
transfer data. 
 
Virtualisation technologies have risen in popularity because of the benefits they offer.  
From a corporate perspective, virtualisation allows companies to provide services to 
clients and helps them to facilitate their own business agility.  The technologies most 
commonly adopted -  network, storage  and server virtualisation - have both 
advantages and disadvantages from the point of view of security (Kim, G, 2007).  At 
the same time, virtualisation is evolving and becoming available to the general public. 
Special ‘slimmed down’ portable applications such as word processors, spreadsheets 
and web browsers have been developed for use from USB sticks, making it possible 
for users to work from any available computer .  In the same timeframe, the pocket PC 
has become a reality thanks to the invention of miniaturized computing environments 
which incorporate both a self-contained operating system and a user area for 
applications – a format which effectively reproduces the workstation experience.     
 
The development of virtual machines (VMs) and other applications specifically 
intended for use direct from a USB key began around the year 2000, closely following 
on the introduction of the high-speed USB2 interface.  In 2005, a team of researchers 
at Stanford University, U.S.A. developed what they termed a ‘LivePC’.  This was a 
piece of software which allowed users to put one or more miniature VMs onto a 
portable device such as an iPod or memory stick.  Stanford’s  LivePC, called Moka5, 
consisted of two separate components: a virtualized operating system and a user 
                                                
1 Kingston Hyper X USB 3, released 2013 
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environment containing applications.  Once running, Moka5 offered a full 
environment from which applications could be used as normal. 
 
The release of Moka5 and the emergence of similar software gave rise to the notion of 
the ‘PC In Your Pocket’.  In 2008, the idea of carrying a personal computing 
environment around on nothing bigger than a USB stick was a novelty and it was 
greeted with enthusiasm by the magazine PC World, which devoted five pages to a 
feature explaining the technology involved (Taylor, K, 2008). Security was a focal 
point of this article, the accent being laid on the ability to use a USB-bound VM to 
access the Internet without fear of virus infection - a VM can be recreated in moments 
so the core system is never lost.  However, other security considerations, notably the 
danger of such miniature VM users being able to carry out online actions 
anonymously, were not taken into account.  In fact, it was stressed that both VMs and 
portable applications could be used without leaving any ‘data files or other traces’ on 
the host machine, a feature important to those wishing to protect personal data 
security.   
 
The boast of user anonymity, which is repeated by the developers of the miniature 
environments considered in this thesis, merits serious concern by anyone involved in 
corporate security or law enforcement, particularly since the software concerned is 
either free or extremely cheap and is readily available for download from the Internet.  
In the interests of informing digital forensic science and practice, therefore, the author 
decided to determine whether the stated claims were true via the research and 
experimentation presented in this thesis.   
 
In sum, the hypothesis of this research is that it is possible to extract and analyse 
artefacts of potential evidential interest from system files that have been created on 
Windows hosts by miniature computing environments running from USB devices. 
 
1.3. Scope of Study 
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This thesis offers an assessment of the placement and analysis of those artefacts of 
potential evidential interest which can be retained on computers running Windows 
operating systems following the use of miniature computing environments from a 
connected USB stick.  It is a focused assessment and there is no intention to imply that 
every avenue of enquiry in this research area has been explored.  Ample opportunity 
exists for further work to be carried out in this field and some suggestions are made in 
Chapter 7.  
 
A number of research areas are touched on in this enquiry, importantly, the analysis of 
artefacts retained on Windows-based computers following the use of USB connectable 
devices.  A significant amount of research has been carried out in this field (Carvey, 
2005 and 2009, Mee and Jones, 2005, Mee et al, 2006 ) and this is drawn upon here.  
However, a previously undocumented source of further information was identified 
during this research.  This information is kept in the IconCache database - a file which 
is normally hidden from the computer user but which is accessible to the digital 
forensic examiner.  Examination of this artefact helps to clarify what programs may 
have been run from a USB key together with any associated file paths and the user 
name utilised for the activity concerned (Collie, 2013). 
 
The capture and analysis of volatile memory (RAM) is also considered in this thesis. 
The value of this capability for the purposes of digital forensic analysis has been 
recognised for many years (Solomon et al, 2007, Petroni et al, 2006, Casey and 
Seglem, 2004).  Since the technique is carried out on live computers, it raises issues in 
respect of the forensically sound collection of evidence.  This is because some device 
must be linked up to the computer under examination in order to receive the captured 
data.  Inevitably, such a link up changes the state of the target machine.  Concerns over 
this consideration have meant that the standard approach to computer analysis remains 
the collection of data from static systems.   This method, which is colloquially known 
as ‘Pull The Plug’, involves taking the power supply out of the back of a live desktop 
computer before accessing the hard drive.  Changes to files and running processes are 
thus prevented.  While arguments exist to support both means of evidence collection, 
live memory capture is now seen as an imperative for network and malware 




The Virtual Machine (VM) as evidence is a subject which has been explored by Brett 
Shavers (2008) and he has noted that the use of a VM will tend to leave artefacts on 
the host system.  The focus of Shavers’ work is on the use of VMs which have been 
installed on a host computer rather than run from an external device.  While he has 
drawn attention to the fact that VMs can be run from removable media and disposed of 
after use, hindering the investigative process, this aspect of research has not been 
developed further. Barrett and Kipper (2010) also looked at the use of VMs, including 
some miniature environments, and monitored the changes made to a host system by 
use of the software.  The results for the miniature VMs showed that, for Windows XP, 
traces of activity – notably the names of the programs involved - were retained in 
certain Registry keys. Evidence of network protocols being opened was also found 
during live testing.  This thesis seeks to extend the above research by further exploring 
the Windows Registry and analysing memory dumps, page files and other artefacts 
recovered from live and static systems running Windows XP and Windows 7, both by 
Microsoft.  
 
The miniature environments considered in this research are desktop virtualisations.  
The applications chosen for testing fall broadly into two categories: Virtual Machines 
and Portable Applications.  Both are designed as standalone programs which will run 
on compatible computers without being installed. Virtual Machines allow for those 
applications which are installed within the provided environment to interact with one 
another.  A picture created in one software package can be placed in a document 
created in another software package, for example.  This facility differentiates them 
from Portable Applications environments, in which the various software packages 
made available are designed to run separately from each other (Ceedo, 2010). A third 
category of virtualisation, the LiveUSB, does not form part of this research project. 
This choice has been made because a LiveUSB consists of a portable device which 
contains a bootable operating system.  Most LiveUSB systems are designed to run 
before the host computer’s operating system boots.  The tools evaluated here are only 
available to a user after the Windows operating system boots.  Thus they interact with 
the host system, creating the potential for traces of user activity to be left behind.  
Whilst the Moka5 LiveUSB does run following the launch of Windows on the host, 
the software is now only available for commercial use.  It has not, therefore, been 
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possible to test recent editions of the software.  A further technology which may have 
been of interest to this enquiry was the U3 but this was discontinued in 2009.  The U3 
was a USB-bound technology developed by SanDisk and Microsoft which gave users 
access to a range of applications, including web browsers.  Although the U3 was 
supposedly designed to leave ‘no trace’ of either user data or application usage on the 
host computer once it was removed, researchers found that artefacts of potential 
interest to digital forensic examiners could be retrieved (Bosschert, 2007; Tank and 
Williams, 2008). 
 
During this research, experiments were carried out using four examples of 
virtualisation software.  All were available for download from the Internet at the time 
of writing.  The operating systems used for testing were: Windows XP (32 bit) and 
Windows 7 (32 bit).  For the purposes of comparison, testing was also carried out on 
Windows 7 (64 bit) systems.  Throughout the period of study and experimentation for 
this thesis, Windows XP and Windows 7 have been the most popular family of 
operating systems in use (W3schools.com, 2014, Net Applications, 2013).  Although 
Windows 8 was released in 2012 and gained ground in the market place, Windows XP 
maintained a respectable following.  Microsoft ceased support for XP on April 8, 2014 
but some argue that it’s popularity will take time to diminish, even in the private sector 
(Casey, 2014). 
 
1.4 Aims, Objectives and Hypothesis 
 
The aim of this research project is to develop a methodology which informs the 
forensic analysis of Windows computers where portable virtualisation software is 
thought to have played a part in the unlawful or unauthorized access of an host system.  
The methodology also aims to assist the investigation of cases in which the potential 
unlawful/unauthorized use of USB connectable devices in general exists. 
 
The objectives of this research are:  
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1)  To explore the potential for portable computing environments to be used to commit 
unlawful acts in the context of existing concerns regarding the use of USB connectable 
devices in general. 
2)  To examine selected miniature computing environments and analyse the effects of 
carrying out a range of common activities via these on an host computer. 
3)  To consider currently available methods of analyzing Windows computer systems 
for evidence of activity involving a user-connected USB device  
4)  To create a chart of key areas to be examined and analysed when investigating the 
use of miniature computing environments and/or USB connectable devices. 
The hypothesis of this research is that it is possible to extract and analyse artefacts of 
potential evidential interest from system files that have been created on Windows 
hosts by miniature computing environments running from USB devices. 
1.5 Methodology overview 
 
A series of procedures have been devised in order to meet the identified objectives of 
this research.  First, a test environment was set up.  This consisted of: 
a) a research computer to host test hard disks. 
b) a set of hard disks to receive test operating systems. 
c) a set of USB keys to receive test vPCs. 
d) forensic hardware and software for disk sanitation, disk cloning and data 
analysis. 
Next, two sets of experiments were developed.  The initial set were baseline 
experiments which were designed to ascertain the types of artefacts which would 
remain on test Windows operating systems following: 
a) the connection of a blank USB memory stick. 
b) the connection of a USB stick bearing a miniature computing environment 
(vPC). 
c) connecting a vPC and launching the software.  
The object of this exercise was to compare outputs from the experiments so that a 
dataset of interest (DSOI) could be isolated and used to inform further work.  A 
second set of scenario-based experiments were then developed, the intention being to 
reproduce some of the basic activities which the user of a vPC would, in the view of 
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the author, likely wish to carry out after introducing it to a host machine. These 
activities were: 
1. Copy a text file ; vPC to host. 
2. Copy a text file ; host to vPC. 
3. Copy a picture file: vPC to host 
4. Copy a picture file; host to vPC 
5. Write and save a text file on the vPC. 
6. Run a program executable on the vPC. 
7. Launch a browser on the vPC. 
8. Conduct a search from a vPC-based browser. 
All experiments in the two sets were to be carried out for each test vPC application in 
the context of each compatible test operating system.  For each experiment, data was 
to be obtained from live RAM and then the static host hard drive following system 
halt.  Analysis would afterwards be conducted using proprietary forensic software. 
1.6 Original contribution to knowledge 
 
This study builds on existing knowledge within digital forensic science and expands it 
in three ways.  Firstly, it presents and explains a previously overlooked artefact which 
aids investigations involving the unauthorized use of both connected and connectable 
devices on Windows hosts.  Secondly, it explores how portable virtualisation software 
interacts with host systems  - a relatively unchartered field of enquiry.  Finally, it 
informs research into antiforensics by showing that, despite its ability to cover and 
wipe its tracks, portable virtualisation software does leave traces of user-related 
activity on host systems which can greatly assist a digital forensic enquiry.  By means 
of the methodology set out in this thesis, it is possible to uncover these traces in RAM 
dumps and by conducting a targeted analysis of static hard drives.  
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The second chapter of this thesis aims to give the background to the research to be 
conducted. Aspects of five topic areas that are relevant to the project are introduced 
and discussed.  Previous work carried out within these topic areas by other researchers 
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is reviewed and summarised and the ways in which this project will advance on 
existing studies are indicated.     
 
The research methodology for this project is set out in detail in the third chapter and 
the experiments that support it are defined and described.  The hypothesis is reiterated.  
The methods, tools and techniques which are used during testing, data collection and 
analysis are identified and any limitations are stated.  A brief summary of the results 
obtained during experimentation is also given.  
 
The fourth chapter focuses on the IconCache database, an artefact previously 
undocumented in terms of its usefulness to digital forensic investigation.  The basic 
workings of the IconCache.db are explored together with the circumstances under 
which information comes to reside in it.  The evidential potential of the IconCache.db 
is demonstrated, in cases where the unauthorized use of USB connectable devices is 
suspected in general and in cases where the unauthorised use of vPCs is suspected in 
particular.         
 
Chapter five fully details the design and implementation of the experiments conducted 
during this research cycle. The data obtained during experimentation is condensed and 
reproduced.  The most informative results in terms of digital forensic investigation are 
reported and considered and brief comments are made. 
 
A thorough scrutiny of all relevant experimental outputs is undertaken in Chapter six.  
Discussion points are raised which centre around the findings made during analysis.  
These include not only those artefacts which were discovered but also those which 
were not discovered, despite a reasonable expectation that they might be present on a 
host system following the experimental actions taken.  Possible rationales for the 
findings are provided.  
 
The seventh and final chapter summarises the entire project, briefly reiterating the  
problem area and recapping on the design and implementation of the experiments.  
The aims and objectives of the research program are repeated, the hypothesis is 
restated and it is explained how the work which has been carried out explores, 
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evaluates and substantiates it.  The project’s contribution to the field of digital forensic 




1.8 Chapter Summary  
 
This chapter introduced the subject matter of this thesis.  The context for the project is 
set, firstly by giving an overview of the data security challenges currently posed by the 
use of USB connectable devices and secondly by discussing virtualisation 
technologies, in particular miniature computing systems which can be run from a 
memory stick.  Cheap and easy to set up and highly portable, the USB-bound 
miniature computing environment, here termed the vPC, is said to offer a high level of 
privacy to the user.   Manufacturers of the vPC software to be examined during this 
study claim that either no data at all or no ‘personal’ data will be left on host 
computing systems after their use.  The implication is that secrecy is ensured – a 
concept which raises concerns for data security professionals, law enforcement 
agencies and digital forensic analysts since it suggests that vPCs could be used as anti-
forensic tools.  A problem area which encompasses the risks associated with USB 
devices in general and USB-bound virtualised computing environments in particular is 
thus identified.  Aspects of this problem area have been addressed by previous 
authorities and this earlier work has shown that the use of USB devices will leave 
artefacts of potential evidential interest on host systems.  It has also been found that 
traces of user actions are likely to be retained on hosts even when evidence has been 
deliberately hidden or destroyed.  The hypothesis is therefore advanced that it should 
be possible to extract and analyse artefacts which could benefit a digital forensic 
enquiry from system files that have been created on Windows hosts by miniature 
computing environments running from USB devices. 
In order to explore the hypothesis of this thesis, certain objectives need to be met. 
These include examining selected vPC environments, the effects of introducing them 
to Windows hosts and the effects of then carrying out common activities. Current 
methods of analysing Windows computers for evidence of USB activity must also be 
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reviewed.  The overall aim of this research project is to develop a methodology  which 
both informs the forensic analysis of Windows computers where portable 
virtualisation software is thought to have been used and assists the investigation of 
cases in which the unlawful or unauthorized use of USB connectable devices is 
suspected.  To that purpose, the following chapters will fully detail the background to 
the project, expand the explanation of the problem area, describe the research 
methodology and the experiments which were devised and conducted, report on and 
discuss all findings made and conclusions drawn, submit that the hypothesis has been 





This chapter is intended to set the context of this research program by discussing five 
main topic areas, aspects of which relate to the problem area identified for study.  The 
order of presentation of the topics does not imply an order of importance.  Rather, it 
has been chosen with the aim of providing the reader with the background information 
necessary to understand the project and the reasons for formulating it.  The five main 
topics and their relevance to this thesis are given in Table 1, below.  Those topics 
marked in orange pertain to virtualisation technologies, those in pink to relevant 
elements of the Windows operating system and digital forensic practice.  
Table 1: Table of topic areas and relevancies to the research program 
Topic Relevance 
1. Virtual Machines (VMs) and 
virtualisation. 
a) To introduce virtualisation as a concept 
and give a general understanding of 
current virtualisation technologies. 
b) To discuss the implications of 
virtualisation in terms of digital 
forensic investigation. 
2. Virtualisation technologies for 
USB memory-stick devices. 
a) To present a brief history of 
virtualisation software for USB 
devices.  
b) To discuss the virtualisation software 
packages chosen for testing in this 
study and those excluded. 
3. Windows memory handling To give an overview of how computers 
running current Windows operating systems 
handle memory and manage live data. 
4. Artefacts created by the use of 
USB devices on Windows 
systems.  
a) To give an account of previous work 
carried out in this area of enquiry. 
b) To show how this thesis will extend 
this knowledge base. 
5. Current Best Practice guides for 
forensic practitioners. 
To summarise existing guidelines for the 
forensically sound capture of data from digital 
devices, to explain their limitations and to 
discuss their influence on current practice.   
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2.1 Virtualisation and Virtual Machines (VMs)  
2.1.1 Overview 
 
Virtualisation involves the creation of an entity e.g. a computer environment which 
appears real but is in fact a simulation running on a host system.  Virtualisation 
software can be used, for example, to allow one computer to run multiple operating 
system images at the same time.  An example of this type of virtual environment 
(Virtual Machine) will be used and studied in this research, albeit in a miniaturized 
format.   
 
The term ‘Virtual Machine’ is normally used to refer to VM software, also known as a 
‘hypervisor’ or ‘virtual machine monitor’. This type of software makes it possible to 
perform multiple identical executions on one computer. (Kietzman, S, 2010).  The 
software itself creates what is known as a virtualisation  layer which sits on top of the 
operating system being used by the host machine, as conceptualised in the following 
diagram: 




In the wider world of commerce, virtualisation can be seen as part of an ‘overall trend 
in enterprise IT which includes autonomic computing and utility computing.’  Haynos, 
M (2008).  Virtualisation is increasing in three main areas of IT: network, storage and 
server virtualisation.  As Kim, G (2008) explains, ‘Virtualisation makes it possible to 
build and deploy IT releases and changes into production faster and more 
economically than ever before.’  However, he warns, this capability also has many 
disadvantages, notably where security controls have not been properly implemented in 
virtualised environments.  The security controls which Kim focuses on are 
configuration settings and changes at the virtualisation layer.  Physical security 
controls, including preventing the introduction of hardware and software are not 
considered in his white paper. 
2.1.2 The forensic perspective 
 
The treatment of the Virtual Machine as evidence has been considered by Brett 
Shavers (2008).  He has also looked at the use of the VM as a tool to aid 
‘antiforensics’ i.e. as a means of masking or erasing the actions carried out by 
someone gaining access to a computer for unethical reasons.  The main focus of 
Shavers’ paper is on the analysis of artefacts from VMs which have been resident on a 
computer during its service life.  However, he does note that VMs can be used from 
removable media and disposed of after use, hindering the investigative process.  The 
opportunity afforded to wrongdoers by USB-bound virtualisations is explored 
comparatively briefly by Shavers and this research project proposes to extend and 
expand his work in this area.  From the point of view of the digital forensic analyst, 
Shavers draws attention to a number of file names which are likely to be left on a host 
machine following activity involving a VM.  He points out, though, that recovering 
these, ‘…will typically not yield the contents of the data residing in the VM.’ 
Nevertheless, finding these traces may open other avenues of enquiry, for instance, the 
investigator might be prompted to look for the suspect VM on other available media.  
Shavers also indicates that the use of a VM will tend to leave artefacts on the host 
operating system e.g. in the system Registry, Lnk files and Prefetch files.  It is 
envisaged that artefacts of this type will inform this research project.  
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In common with other authorities, for example Penhallurick, M (2005) and Sammes, T 
(2007), Shavers discusses the use of VM as a tool for forensic analysis, though in 
much less detail.  This aspect of VM technology is outside the scope of this research 
although it is a topic of great interest.    
 
Barrett and Kipper (2010) have also explored the use of VMs and the types of artefacts 
which may be found on a computer system as a result of any related activity.  Two 
miniature VM environments were included in the authors’ work and the changes made 
to a host system by use of these pieces of software were monitored.  The results for the 
miniature VMs showed that, for Windows XP, traces of activity – notably the names 
of the executable files for the programs concerned - were retained in certain Registry 
keys. Evidence of network protocols being opened was also found during live testing.  
This project seeks to extend Barrett and Kipper’s research by analysing other 
virtualised environments and by examining memory dumps, page files and other 
artefacts recovered from live and static systems running Windows XP and Windows 7.  
2.2 Virtualisation Technologies for USBs 
 
Two types of technologies will be considered in this research: 
1.  The miniature VM environment  
2.  Portable application software. 
 
A handful of companies have brought VMware designed for portable storage devices 
to the market over the past five years.  Two of the first applications were Moka5 and 
MojoPac, both of which were free when first released. These innovative software 
packages offered a familiar computing environment to users whilst freeing them from 
a given work space.  This gave rise to the notion of the ‘PC In Your Pocket’, a concept 
explored in some depth by the magazine PC World.  In an article which explained the 
technology involved, it was stated that the introduction of high-speed USB2 interfaces 
on the latest computer workstations had made it possible to run VMs and applications 
direct from USB connectible devices (Taylor, K, 2008).  The functionality and 
security of the technology involved was discussed, the security aspect revolving 
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around the ability to use a VM to access the Internet without fear of picking up a virus 
infection.  This is possible because, once built and configured, a VM can be recreated 
quickly and easily over and over again.  The core system is never lost.  However, other 
aspects of security, such as the danger of miniature VMs being used to carry out 
malicious acts anonymously either in the work place or online, was not taken into 
consideration in this article.  On the contrary, it was stressed that both VMs and 
portable applications could be used without leaving any ‘data files or other traces’ on a 
host machine.  At the time the article was published, both Moka5 and MojoPac could 
only be run if the user had administrator privileges on the host machine.  This would 
have afforded a certain amount of security.  That situation soon changed. 
 
In 2008, the virtualisation technology offered by Moka5 enabled the user to create a 
portable PC – known as a ‘Live PC’ - based on the Linux operating system. The 
software, which was created by a team at Stanford University, U.S.A, in 2005, was 
based on the free VMware Player. In fact VMPlayer had to be installed onto the host 
system before a Live PC could be run.  Once running, the Live PC offered a full 
environment from which applications could be used as normal. Moka5 is now only 
available as a commercial product and in the USA, therefore it will not be tested 
during experimentation for this project.   
 
Other types of LivePC , also largely based on variations of the Linux operating 
system, continue to be freely available for use.  These technologies consist of a 
bootable operating system which can be contained on a USB or DVD.  Where they 
differ from Moka5 is that the operating systems concerned do not depend on Windows 
i.e. they boot independently and before the Windows operating system.  This being the 
case, the software does not interact with Windows and will not leave any artefacts 
within the Windows operating system.  This style of virtualisation has therefore been 
excluded from this study.  A further exclusion is a technology known as U3.  The U3 
was a USB-bound miniature computing environment which gave users access to a 
number of applications, including web browsers.  Developed by SanDisk and 
Microsoft, U3 created problems with certain Windows operating systems, notably 
Vista, and work on it was discontinued in 2009. 
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The miniature environments considered in this research are designed to run on 
Windows PCs via a USB connectible drive.  Two with strong similarities are MojoPac 
and Ceedo.  To use Ceedo’s description of the technology, it, ‘enables a suite of 
standard Windows applications to run on a host PC without installation’.  This type of 
virtualisation gives the user a full workspace, complete with applications, application 
settings and user data.  One of the advantages of this kind of virtualisation is that 
applications which are run within the environment can interact with one another in the 
way that they do on Windows PCs.  This differentiates them from portable 
applications, which run separately from each other. As a white paper from Ceedo 
(2010) explains, ‘Standard application virtualisation technology implements a 
virtualisation layer between each application and the operating system. A problem 
with this approach is that each virtualized application is isolated such that it cannot 
interact with other applications in the same environment.  This means, for instance, 
that it is not possible to embed an Excel spreadsheet into a Word document.’ 
 
The white paper further notes that portable applications ‘do not use the Windows 
registry, do not store files in the standard Windows folder, and do not use any 3rd party 
ActiveX components or COM objects’.  Portable applications are written in a way, 
‘which will not use any Windows persistent services.’ 
 
This observation has also been made by Bem, D and Heubner, E (2007), who state that 
Windows is not designed to be portable:  it relies on the Windows registry, installs or 
uses already installed dynamic libraries (DLLs) and stores files and profiles in various 
system folders.  Consequently, they add, in order to make a portable application, a 
software developer needs to write it in such a way that it does not use the Windows 
registry nor store its files anywhere on the host computer.   
 
The Windows operating system has been updated since Bem and Heubner presented 
their findings and, since the introduction of Windows 8 in 2012, a portable version of 
Windows has become available.  The portable system is called ‘Windows To Go’ and 
is only available in the Enterprise version of the software.  In order to run normally, 
Windows To Go requires the USB device that it is held on to have a minimum 
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capacity of 32 GB.  It must also be highly specified in terms of read/write speeds 
(Microsoft, 2013).  
2.2.1 Test miniature environments  
 
The preceding paragraphs in this section describe those types of currently available 
technologies which may be termed miniature computing environments.   The 
applications chosen for testing fall broadly into two categories: Virtual Machines and 
Portable Applications.  The environments chosen for testing in this research are: 
 
1: MojoPac 
2: Ceedo Personal 
3: LupoPenSuite 
4: Portable Apps 
 
Of these, MojoPac  may be considered a miniature VM in that it emulates the 
functionality of a particular computer system – Windows XP.  Ceedo Personal is a 
virtualisation software which runs on a number of Windows hosts. It may be 
considered as offering application virtualisation in that it encapsulates the application 
software it contains, allowing it to run as if it were installed on the host operating 
system whilst actually keeping it separate.  In this sense, Ceedo Personal presents in 
much the same way as LupoPenSuite and Portable Apps, both of which can be 
categorised as portable applications.  
2.2.2 The promise of privacy 
 
For each of the above environments, direct references to the high level of personal 
privacy that a person can expect to enjoy when using the software are made in 
promotional literature.  Two of the strongest claims are made by the manufacturers of 
MojoPac and Ceedo.  The advertisement for MojoPac, for example, claims: “Your 
MojoPac is completely private and secure.  Your applications, your browsing history 
and your data is never left behind on the PC it is connected to.  What happens on 
MojoPac stays on MojoPac” (Appendix 1.1).  While that for Ceedo Personal states it:   
“has zero-footprint, meaning once you plug-out your USB nothing from Ceedo 
Personal is left behind on the host PC.”    (Appendix 1.2) 
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For the portable applications Lupo PenSuite and Portable Apps, the supporting 
literature is more carefully worded.  For LupoPenSuite, the following is published 
within the FAQ section: 
 
“A portable application is a computer software that you can carry around with you on 
a portable device, use it on any Windows computer and when you unplug the device 
none of your personal data is left behind.”2 
 
Likewise, the PortableApps site defines what a portable app is: 
“A portable app is a computer program that you can carry around with you on a 
portable device and use on any Windows computer. When your USB flash drive, 
portable hard drive, iPod or other portable device is plugged in or your cloud drive is 
synced, you have access to your software and personal data just as you would on your 
own PC. And when you unplug the device, none of your personal data is left behind.”3 
The phrases ‘your data’ and ‘your personal data’ may, of course, be interpreted in a 
variety of ways.  Nevertheless, there is a clear implication that a user’s personal 
privacy will be protected. 
2.3 Windows Memory Handling 
 
Operating systems handle system memory in a highly complex way.  An in-depth 
explanation goes beyond the scope this thesis.  Instead, areas of Windows operating 
systems which may generate or hold artefacts of evidential interest as a result of a 
memory handling process will be explored together with those particular processes. 
 
In overview, the term ‘memory’ is generally used to refer to RAM (Random Access 
Memory). It is not the same as ‘storage’, which is normally taken to mean the capacity 
of a computer’s hard drive (Kingston Technologies, n.d.).  RAM is used to hold 
temporary instructions and the data needed to complete tasks.  Information is put into 
RAM by the operating system on an ad hoc basis.  In simple terms, information which 




is being used in real time is swapped in and out of the volatile RAM memory so that 
the operating system can multi-task.  The information is held in files known as page 
files.  As Russinovich M., and Solomon, D. (2005), explain more technically, page 
files are used to store modified pages which are still in use by some processes but have 
had to be written to disk.  Whilst much of the data held in RAM will be lost when the 
computer is switched off, therefore, some can remain on the system in the form of 
page files.   
 
Russinovich and Solomon provide a thorough discussion of  Windows memory 
management, showing both how Microsoft Windows implements virtual memory and 
how it manages the subset of virtual memory kept in physical memory.  They explain 
that the Windows memory manager consists of several components which deal, 
amongst the things, with the allocation, reallocation and management of virtual 
memory.  It is responsible for handling the paging process and for managing the size 
of the page file. 
 
An important aspect of paging files is that they cannot be deleted while the computer 
system is running. Furthermore, if the system has not been configured to clear the page 
file at shut down, a quantity of the data placed there will be retained by the system and 
can afterwards be viewed.  From the point of view of forensic examiners, therefore, 
paging files may be of interest. 
 
Research on the contents of RAM has shown that although the contents of page files 
are held in volatile memory, large segments are unlikely to survive more than 5 
minutes (Solomon et al., 2007).   Nevertheless, small segments may be retained up to 
2 hours after the data is committed to memory.   
 
The value of capturing and analysing live memory during digital forensic 
investigations has been recognised for many years (Solomon et al, 2007, Petroni et al, 
2006, Casey and Seglem, 2004).  However, there is no standard approach to extracting 
this data.  Instead, there are a number of methods, as discussed by Ruff (2007).  The 
analysis of volatile data is a developing field but it is possible to identify rootkits, 
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Trojans and other viruses using the techniques evolved thus far (Schuster, 2006, 
Carvey, 2007).  
2.4 Windows artefacts 
 
A range of artefacts are created on Windows systems whenever a USB device is 
plugged in, notably in the Registry.  A number of researchers have shown that the 
Registry is a rich resource for digital investigation, in particular Carvey, H (2005); 
Carvey and Altheide (2005), Mee, V and Jones, A (2005) and Mee et al (2006).  These 
authorities have focused on the traces left by USB storage devices on computers 
running the Windows XP operating system.  The same or similar artefacts have since 
been identified in newer versions of the Windows operating system e.g. Windows 
Vista and Windows 7.     
 
Carvey (2009) has noted that when a USB device is first connected, the Windows plug 
and play manager elicits a device descriptor from it. It then finds a driver for the 
device and stores the information in the setupapi.log file.  Once this action is 
complete, a key is created in the HKEY local machine portion of the Registry at: 
 
HKEY_LOCAL MACHINE\System Current\ControlSet\Enum\USBSTOR 
 





where *** represents manufacturer and product information data gleaned from the 
device by the Windows operating system. 
 
An unique instance ID is created from this device class ID. This is usually the serial 
number of the device in question. If more than one device of the same class are 
connected e.g.. Two identical USB keys, each will nonetheless have unique IDs on the 
host system.  Where the USB device does not have a serial number, Windows' Plug-
 29 
and-Play (PnP) Manager will create an unique instance ID for it. This ID will consist 
of an alphanumeric string, of which the second character is an ampersand. 
 
Carvey also notes that a second repository of information regarding USB devices is 
the MountedDevices key. This records the drive letter assigned to each device 
connected to the host system e.g F:\   The Windows system may also store traces of 
USB connection activity via Link  (.lnk) files, Shortcuts and the PreFetch folder.    
Such artefacts can help a forensic analyst trace file-related activity, such as opening a 
document on or copying a picture to a particular device (Roy and Jain, 2012). Other 
artefacts are created in the Windows Registry when programs are executed. The 
UserAssist key, for example, stores information about recently used and frequently 
used programs and the number of times these programs have been launched (Stevens, 
2010). If a program is run from a USB connectable device, therefore, it is possible that 
a record of that action will be kept by the system in this Registry key.  Using a new 
application on a Windows system can also populate the MUICache Registry key 
(NirSoft, 2011), so this key may also contain useful information. 
 
The prior research mentioned above has all concentrated on the role of the Windows  
Registry in locating artefacts from USB connectable devices.  The research conducted 
during this thesis has extended the field of enquiry by investigating the forensic 
potential of the IconCache database.  This artefact, which lies outside of the Registry, 
has been shown to retain file paths to programs and processes which have run on both 
fixed and attached drives such as USB devices.  These activities can be associated 
with individual user names which have been set up on the host computer.  Thus, where 
the unauthorised or covert use of systems and programs is suspected, analysis of the 
IconCache database can also prove useful (Collie, 2013).    
 
The research reviewed in this area has all focused on the artefacts created on Windows 
systems when USB devices are connected.  
2.5 Current Best Practice guides for forensic practitioners 
 
‘Best Practice’ procedures for handling computer evidence and mobile phone evidence 
have been considered by a number of authorities, mainly those concerned with law 
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enforcement.  In the UK, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) has 
published a well-known set of guidelines which are primarily aimed at serving officers 
but also apply to investigators and practitioners of digital forensics in the private 
sector.  The ACPO guidelines, originally approved in 1999, were updated and 
republished in 2012. 
 
The Principles of Digital Evidence, as laid out in the Guide are: 
Principle 1: No action taken by law enforcement agencies, persons employed within 
those agencies or their agents should change data which may subsequently be relied 
upon in court. 
Principle 2: In circumstances where a person finds it necessary to access original data, 
that person must be competent to do so and be able to give evidence explaining the 
relevance and the implications of their actions. 
Principle 3: An audit trail or other record of all processes applied to digital evidence 
should be created and preserved.  An independent third party should be able to 
examine those processes and achieve the same result. 
Principle 4: The person in charge of the investigation has overall responsibility for 
ensuring that the law and these principles are adhered to. 
 
In common with other published guides in this subject area, for example, First 
Responder reference guides published by the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. 
Secret Service, the ACPO guidelines advise on how digital equipment should be 
handled in order to best preserve evidence.  The accent is on not losing or 
inadvertently spoiling digital evidence during the seizure of equipment, in particular, 
at the scene of a crime.  The majority of the guides written for law enforcement 
agencies do not cover the subsequent analysis of data although the principles laid 
down for the handling of items of evidential interest are relevant at all stages of 
investigation, from crime scene to laboratory.  The latest version of the ACPO guide 
now contains a brief section on analysis, giving views on who should carry out such 
analysis and the need for analysis to be properly targeted towards gathering evidence 
relevant to the case in hand. 
 
A document which goes into much more depth is the Directors’ and Corporate 
Advisors’ Guide to Digital Investigations and Evidence published by the Information 
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Assurance Advisory Council (IAAC) in 2009 (Sommer, P, 2009).  This details 
relevant legal issues involved with the analysis of computer systems, media and 
mobile phones as well as their collection and preservation .  Advice is also given on a 
‘Corporate plan of action’ for digital incidents, although this paper does not go into 
data analysis procedure.   
 
The Guidelines on PDA Forensics published by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) in 2004 gives a comprehensive introduction to PDA technology 
and goes on to describe an entire procedure, from the seizure and handling of PDAs 
through to their examination and analysis, detailing the location of evidence and the 
use of hardware and software.  It also advises on subsequent reporting.  This guide is 
focused entirely on PDA forensics, however, and does not consider other digital 
media.  Likewise, the NIST Guidelines on Cell Phone Forensics (2007) is a 
comprehensive treatise on the seizure, handling and forensic examination of mobile 
phones alone.  It may nevertheless be considered an excellent primer for anyone 
interested in the forensic investigation of mobile phones.    
  
The guides mentioned above are chiefly concerned with maintaining the forensic 
integrity of digital data as evidence.  Further resources have been made available to the 
digital forensics examiners in terms of where to look for evidence during analysis.  For 
example, ‘quick guides’ for USB key forensics on Windows XP, Vista and 7 systems 
have been written by Rob Lee (2009) and made available through the SANS Institute 
website. (Appendix I a) A similar guide has been published online by the consultancy 
firm, Arsenal Recon (Appendix I b).   
 
An important aspect of digital forensic examination not mentioned in the older guides 
reviewed here but covered in ACPO (2012) is the acquisition and analysis of volatile 
data.  Although the process has been known for over a decade (Crescenzo et al., 1999), 
it is not commonly used because the technique requires prerequisite knowledge and 
training.  Furthermore, it raises issues in respect of the forensically sound collection of 
evidence.  As a result, the standard approach to computer analysis remains the capture 
of static systems, or what is colloquially known as ‘Pull The Plug’, since it involves 
pulling the power cable out from the back of a running computer.  There are 
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arguments to support both methods but while live memory capture is now seen as an 
imperative for network and malware investigations as well as live response (Anson et 
al, 2012, Malin et al, 2012), law enforcement agencies tend to avoid it.  One possible 
explanation, at least in the UK, may be a conservative attitude based on Principle 2 of 
the ACPO guidelines - it could be difficult for an officer to explain both the necessity 
and implications of his/her actions to a Judge and Jury, especially in the face of clever 
questioning supported by legal argument from an opposing barrister.  There would 
also be no way of conforming to Principle 3 of the ACPO guidelines as far as the 
acquisition of volatile data was concerned .  The process could not be repeated by a 
third party.   
 
2.6. Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter aims to set the context of this research program by identifying and 
discussing five headline topics, all of which relate to the problem area identified for 
study. 
These topics include: 
• Virtual Machines (VMs)  
• Virtualisation technologies for USBs  
• Windows memory handling 
• Windows forensic artefacts  






This chapter restates the hypothesis of this thesis and the aims of the overall research 
project.  The research methodology for the project is set out in detail and the 
experiments are described. 
3.1 Restatement of Hypothesis and aims  
 
The hypothesis of this project is that it is possible to extract and analyse artefacts of 
potential evidential interest from system files that have been created on Windows 
hosts by miniature computing environments running from USB devices.  The aim is to 
develop a methodology which informs the forensic analysis of Windows computers 
where portable virtualisation software is thought to have played a part in the unlawful 
or unauthorized access of an host system.  The methodology also aims to assist the 
investigation of cases in which the potential unlawful/unauthorized use of  USB 
connectable devices in general exists. 
3.2 Research methodology 
 
The purpose of this research is to isolate information of potential evidential interest 
where a miniature computing environment has been introduced to a Windows host via 
a USB connectable device.  To this end, a methodology has been devised which is 
based on both reading research and experimental research.  The reading research, 
described in Chapter 2, aims to show the current extent of knowledge which lies 
within the areas pertaining to the central research question of this thesis.  The 
experimental research is described in the following subsections.   
 
Briefly,  three baseline experiments are carried out in order to identify the types of 
artefacts which will remain on the test operating systems following: 
a) the connection of a blank USB memory stick. 
b) the connection and use of a USB bearing a miniature computing environment 
(vPC). 
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Thereafter, a series of defined experiments are carried out in order to collect data.  A 
Data Set Of Interest (DSOI) is isolated during the analysis stage.  A comparison of 
results then takes place, against which the thesis hypothesis can be evaluated. 
A graphic expression of the research methodology is shown in Figure 2, below. 
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3.2.1  Test environment 
 
The physical hardware used was a single PC workstation with an Intel Celeron 64 bit 
processor (E3400 @ 2.60 Ghz), 4 GB of RAM and a standard VGA card. The 
computer was not initially connected to any network.  
 
A formal test host environment was established to ensure that the same experiment 
could be repeated consistently using different versions of the Microsoft Windows 
operating system.  This was achieved as follows: 
 
A clean install of each test operating system was made onto a set of 250GB hard disks 
which had previously been wiped using standard forensic hardware.  This was done to 
eliminate potential data contamination during operating system installation and use.  
The hard disks were also wiped between each experimental phase.  Each test operating 
system installation was set up to run using UK English and with the time set to GMT 
London.  A single user name and computer name was used throughout.  Once created, 
the individual test systems were cloned to other previously sanitized disks.  The latter 
were then used for experimentation (Figure 3). 
 
The hardware used for wiping and imaging was: Logicube Talon and for cloning: 
Logicube SuperSonix. 
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Figure 3: Test disk preparation 
 
3.2.2  Test Design Conditions 
 
In order to control sources of variation during experimentation, the test environment 
was designed to be as uncomplicated as possible.  Each OS install was created direct 
from an installation disk.  No patches or updates were installed. The utility Process 
Monitor was installed onto each disk used during the preliminary testing phase for 
auditing purposes (See 3.2.6.3, below).  No additional programs or applications were 
installed.  With a view to replicating the type of scene a digital forensic examiner 
might be called into, for example, where a small to medium enterprise suspected IP 
theft or the introduction of malware to a computer system, the following assumptions 
are made for each test carried out: 
• That the ‘suspect’ workstation is running when the examiner enters.   
• That no enterprise solution exists to allow live system monitoring.  
• That the workstation under review is the only evidence source available to the 
examiner. 
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3.2.3  Test Operating systems  
 
For the purposes of this research, 32 bit and 64 bit versions of two Microsoft Windows 
operating systems were examined:  Windows XP Pro, and Windows 7 Pro (Figure 4).  
These were chosen because, during the research period,  Windows XP and Windows 7 
accounted for more than 80% of all operating systems in use whilst Windows 8 
accounted for only 1.77% of the market share (StatCounter, 2012; w3schools, 2012).  
In April 2014,  when Microsoft stopped support for Windows XP, the operating 
system remained the most popular in terms of internet usage in Europe , South 
America, Asia and Africa (StatCounter, 2014).  At that time, Windows 7 was reported 
as the leading global operating system, accounting for 54.7% of the market share.  At 
the time of writing, therefore, it is likely that computer examiners will commonly be 
analyzing versions of these operating systems. 
Figure 4: Test operating systems 
 
Windows XP Pro SP3 
32 bit 64 bit 
Windows  7 Pro 
32 bit 64 bit 
 
3.2.4  Miniature computing environments to be tested  
 
The miniature environments tested are shown in Figure 5, together with their 
compatibility with the test operating systems under review.  Illustrations showing how 




Figure 5: Test vPC applications and Windows compatibility 
* = Application Virtualisation 
 
The technologies are briefly described further below: 
a) MojoPac 
MojoPac is a virtualisation which presents a desktop environment which 
closely emulates Windows XP.  A user has a personal profile, files and folders 
and can load applications e.g. Microsoft Office into the environment from a 
standard installation disk.  In common with a full version of Windows XP, 
MojoPac has its own Registry and shell.  A user also has access to USB 
devices connected via the host.   MojoPac runs independently and in isolation 
from the host operating system.  In these ways, MojoPac acts like a virtual 
machine and, it is suggested, may be considered a miniature VM.   
 
First launched in 2006, MojoPac was developed by RingCube Technologies 
and can be used on computers running Windows XP.  Development was 
discontinued around 2012 after RingCube was acquired by Citrix but the 
software is still available for download from the Internet.     
 
b) Ceedo Personal 
Ceedo Personal from Ceedo Technologies Ltd is one of a suite of products 
based on the manufacturer’s own workspace virtualisation technologies. The 
software presents as a taskbar at the top of a computer user’s desktop.  
Test OS compatibility 
Type of vPC Application 
Win XP Win 7 







Y Y N N 
Ceedo Personal 
v. 5.0.1.7 





Y Y Y Y 
Portable Apps 
v.11.2 
Y Y Y Y 
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Specially adapted applications can be loaded into this workspace from the 
Ceedo website.  Host computer services such as access to USB ports and DVD 
drive can be accessed from within the Ceedo workspace.  
 
As a software technology, Ceedo may be considered an application 
virtualisation i.e. the program encapsulates the application software from the 
host operating system on which it is executed.  Applications e.g. Firefox are 
not installed on the host but they run as if they were.  Although it has much in 
common with portable application software, it is more sophisticated in its 
operation.  Privacy settings are available to the user, the default privacy 
settings being to keep any temporary files created during use within Ceedo and 
to clear temporary files on exiting the software.   
 
c) Lupo PenSuite     and  
d) Portable Apps 
Both these programs can be classified as portable applications – they are 
designed to run on a compatible computer without being installed.  Both offer 
designated folders for user files e.g. MyDocs, MyMusic. Cut-down versions of 
popular applications such as browsers and word processors can be installed 
into the environment.  Neither Lupo PenSuite nor Portable Apps offer privacy 
settings.   
3.2.5  Data collection 
 
For static systems, data collection was carried out by attaching a write-blocked imager 
to the host hard disk.  Volatile data was collected by introducing forensic software to 
the host system via a USB connectable memory stick.  The forensic software used 
was: FTK Imager Lite by Access Data and RamCapturer (32 & 64) by Belkasoft.   
3.2.6  Data analysis 
 
The data to be analysed was present in RAM dumps and in specific areas of the 
Windows operating system.  These are detailed below and a classification of artefacts 
is presented in Figure 6, which follows at the end of this subsection.   
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3.2.6.1 RAM data 
 
RAM captures were analysed using HBGary Responder Community Edition v. 
2.0.2.1438.  Keyword searches for the names of the software in use and related 
processes were carried out on the memory dumps obtained. 
3.2.6.2 Static systems 
 
For each experiment, the analysis of data collected from static test systems consisted 
of scrutinizing five main areas of the Windows operating system for artefacts. These 
areas, which were identified based on research and working knowledge, were: 
Registry, Prefetch, Link (.lnk)  files, IconCache.db and Pagefile.  In the Registry, up to 
twelve keys likely to retain artefacts as a result of USB-related activity were checked.  
In a real-life situation, an examiner would pay attention to the finer detail of the dates 
and times associated with such activities, correlating information gathered from 
Registry keys with that to be found, for example, in system event and setupapi logs. 
 
The software used for analysis was FTK v 5.1. 
3.2.6.2.1 The IconCache.db 
 
During this research, it was discovered that artefacts of potential evidential interest are 
retained in the IconCache.db, a hidden file which is created and maintained on 
computers running Windows operating systems.  This led to an extended investigation 
of the database and its workings.  Chapter 4 is devoted to detailing the 
experimentation carried out during this phase of research and the findings made.  
Notable results were published in the academic journal ‘Digital Investigation’ in 2013 
(Appendix IV).  This research on the IconCache.db was later extended by others and 
the original paper was cited extensively in another article published in the same 
journal in 2014 (Appendix V).  
 
3.2.6.2 Preliminary System monitoring 
 
Preliminary system monitoring was carried out using the utility Process Monitor 
v.2.944, developed by Windows Sysinternals.  Process Monitor is a tool which 
                                                
4 Available from:  www.technet.microsoft.com 
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monitors and displays file system activity on computers running the Windows 
operating system as the activity occurs in real time.  This tool identified the ports 
which are opened and the processes which run following the connection of particular 
vPCs. These findings helped to inform the analysis to be carried out. 
3.2.6.3 Recording findings 
 
Experimental outputs were recorded into a table devised for the purpose of collecting 
and collating results. (Appendix VI ) This consisted of a listing of Registry keys which 
are known to retain artefacts following the connection of a USB device plus other 
areas of the operating system, for which the same is true.  It also contained a column 
for noting down any artefacts found in RAM.  
 
Following initial experimentation, it was found that a number of Registry keys 
retained similar information e.g. the name of the vPC executable which had been 
attached to the host and run.  A sub-set of seven key system locations were found to 
yield the most detailed artefacts.  These are discussed in Chapter 5. 
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3.2.7 Test procedure  
 
Two main tests were carried out, the first to ascertain what artefacts remained from 
experimentation following a memory dump taken from a live system, the second to 
ascertain what could be gathered from the same system, once static. The results were 
then compared. 
STATIC SYSTEM 
1. Registry HKey 
 1.1 SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet \Enum\USB 
\Enum\USBSTOR 
 1.2 SYSTEM \Control\DeviceClasses\{alphanumeric} 
1.3 SYSTEM \MountedDevices 
 1.4 SOFTWARE\Microsoft \Windows Portable Devices\Devices 











1.5 SOFTWARE\Classes \LocalSettings\Software\Microsoft 
\Windows\Shell\MuiCache 
(WinVista, Win7) 
 1.6 UsrClass.dat\Local Settings \Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell 
2. Prefetch 
3. Lnk files 
4. IconCache.db 
5. Pagefile (s) 
LIVE SYSTEM 




In the interests of brevity, only the most useful results out of a total of 112 outputs are 
reported in this thesis. 
3.2.7.1 Test scenarios  
 
A series of scenarios were developed with the aim of mimicking a set of basic general 
activities the user of a vPC would, in the view of the author, likely wish to carry out.  
These were numbered as follows : 
1. Copy a text file ; vPC to host. 
2. Copy a text file ; host to vPC. 
3. Copy a picture file: vPC to host 
4. Copy a picture file; host to vPC 
5. Write and save a text file on the vPC. 
6. Run a program executable on the vPC. 
7. Launch a browser on the vPC. 
8. Conduct a search from a vPC-based browser. 
Each of these activities were carried out for each test vPC application in the context of 
each compatible test operating system.  A system of identifying the vPC and OS used 
for each experiment was devised (Figure 7 ).  In this, each vPC and OS were 
designated a letter of the alphabet and the experiments to be carried out were 
numbered.  Thus, a shorthand emerged.  For example, the vPC Ceedo, designated 
letter B, tested against Windows XP Pro (32bit), designated letter W, for experiment 1 
becomes experiment BW1.  The same vPC tested against Windows  7 (64 bit) for 
experiment 1 becomes experiment BZ1. 
 
A form was created using this system in order to record the results obtained during 
experimentation and correlate them with the record sheets filled out during analysis.  
This is produced in Appendix VII. 
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Figure 7: Identification system for test vPCs & Windows OSs during 
experimentation 
 
vPC name vPC Designation: Windows OS: OS Designation: 
MojoPac A XP Pro (32) W 
Ceedo B XP Pro (64) X 
Lupo PenSuite C 7 Pro (32) Y 
Portable Apps D 7 Pro (64) Z 
 
3.3 Experimentation 
3.3.1  Baseline experiments 
 
Three baseline experiments were first carried out, as follows: 
a) Introduce clean USB key into the host system, nothing more 
(Experiment A1 – Figure 8). 
b) Introduce USB key containing vPC executable into the host system, 
nothing more (Experiment A2 – Figure 9 ). 
c) Introduce USB key containing vPC executable into the host system.  
Run vPC (Experiment A3 – Figure 10 ).  
For b) and c) above, experiments were carried out for each combination of vPC and 
test OS. 
 
Thereafter, a first phase of experimentation involved testing four (4) applications in 
two (2) versions of  Windows XP for each of the eight (8) experimental test scenarios 
outlined in 3.2.7.1, above – a total of 64 outputs. A second phase involved testing 
three (3) applications in two (2) versions of Windows 7 – a total of 48 outputs.  
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3.4 Results overview 
 
3.4.1 Baseline experiments 
 
For the three baseline experiments and for every combination of vPC and OS, artefacts 
related to the attachment of the USB drive – such as the drive letter allocated to the 






This result was expected since the USB enumeration process during which the host 
machine reads a connected device’s descriptors, loads the appropriate drivers for it and 
configures the device for use, occurs automatically in Windows.  It was also possible 
to find a record of the first connection of the USB devices in log files, specifically 
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‘setupapi.dev.log’ in Windows XP and ‘setupAPI.dev.log’ and ‘setupapi.app.log’ in 
Windows 7. 
 
For Baseline b), no artefacts relating to the name of the vPC stored on the drive were 
found in the Registry or elsewhere.  For MojoPac alone, both the related icon and 
textual references to the executable file were to be found in the IconCache.db.  
 
For Baseline c) a large number of further artefacts, which identified the vPC being 
used, were located in the Registry, IconCache.db and elsewhere.  A table of the most 
useful ‘quick reference’ locations was assembled and is shown in Appendix VIII. 
3.4.2 Test scenarios 
 
It was found that the introduction and use of USB-bound vPCs on Windows hosts can 
create numerous artefacts of interest to digital forensic examiners. The most 
informative of these will be found in Registry keys as well as in Link files / Shortcuts, 
Prefetch and the IconCache database.  At a minimum, analysis of these artefacts will 
enable an enquirer to establish the name of the vPC environment invoked, the user 
name under which it was introduced to the host and which programs were run from 
within it, together with relevant dates and times, the drive letter allocated to the 
containing USB key plus details enabling identification of that key, such as the make 
and serial number.  All of this information is available when a computer has been 
closed down using the traditional ‘pull the plug’ method.  The Pagefile may be a 
further resource on static systems. 
 
This research has shown that the connection of a vPC does not preclude the Windows 
registry from retaining information which helps identify the container drive.  Once a 
vPC is run, the icon associated with its executable file will be stored in the 
IconCache.db and the program name and its associated file path will be documented 
there. 
 
For some vPCs, the names of files created and saved within the miniature environment 
are retained on the host, together with the file path.  Folders temporarily created on the 
host when a portable browser is used from a vPC and which are afterwards 
automatically deleted may also be visible within forensic software.  This type of 
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finding could further usefully inform a digital forensic investigation. Where the 
collection of live memory is possible, this can reveal the names of files copied 
between a vPC and the host although file paths may not be available.  Further research 
is needed in order to establish whether more pertinent artefacts could be gleaned from 
the contents of virtual memory for this and other user related activity. 
While results from pagefile analysis during this round of research did not reveal 
anything of great note, further testing might produce something worthwhile.  The host 
systems considered were running the native OS alone, placing limited demands on 
memory.  Also they were only run for short periods, therefore there was little time for 
artefacts to accumulate in the pagefile.  Further research could also establish whether, 
in common with malware and encryption keys, artefacts of potential interest relating to 
the use of vPCs may be retained in a computer’s hibernation file. 
 
3.5 Chapter summary 
 
This Chapter restates the hypothesis of this project, namely that it is possible to extract 
and analyse artefacts of potential evidential interest from system files that have been 
created on Windows hosts by miniature computing environments running from USB 
devices (vPCs).  The aim of the research is to develop a methodology which informs 
the forensic analysis of Windows computers where portable virtualisation software is 
thought to have played a part in the unlawful or unauthorized access of an host system. 
 
The research methodology is described, together with the test environment, conditions 
and procedures.  The miniature computing environments and operating systems to be 
tested are identified.  The experiments carried out are detailed, as are the way in which 
outputs are recorded and analysed.    
 
An overview of the results obtained is given.  It was found that the introduction and 
use of USB-bound vPCs on Windows hosts can create numerous artefacts of interest 
to digital forensic examiners.  At a minimum, analysis of these artefacts will enable an 
enquirer to establish the name of the vPC environment invoked, the user name under 
which it was introduced to the host, the drive letter allocated to the containing USB 
key plus details enabling identification of that key, such as the make and serial 
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number.  For the majority of vPCs tested, it was also possible to ascertain which 
programs were run from within the given environment, together with relevant dates 
and times, 
 
An important discovery made during this research program was that artefacts of 
potential evidential interest are retained in the IconCache.db, a hidden file which is 
created and maintained on computers running Windows operating systems.  A paper 
on this aspect of forensic enquiry was published in the academic journal ‘Digital 
Investigation’ in 2013 and has since been cited.  Chapter 4 details the experimentation 
carried out during this phase of the research and the findings made.  
 
The VM has been defined and its use as a computing environment has been described.  
The potential for the use of VM software to leave artefacts of possible evidential 
interest on a host machine has been discussed, leading to the notion that the same may 
be true of miniature VM software which is now available and can be run from a USB 
connectable memory stick.  Equally, other virtualisation technologies which provide a 
cut-down computing environment from USBs may cause artefacts to be created on a 
host.  Those which can be described as portable applications and which will be 
examined in this study have been reviewed.    
 
An overview of how the Windows operating system handles memory has been given.  
The types of artefacts which the every-day use of a USB connectable device will 
create on a host machine have also been considered.  These elements of the discourse 
encapsulate the background knowledge which currently informs digital forensic 
analysis in this area.  The capture and analysis of volatile data is also looked at.  It is 
postulated that although this can be a valuable source of case-relevant data, it is often 
left untapped because it requires evidence gathering techniques which are unfamiliar 
to many digital forensic operatives.  At the same time, both legal strictures and the 
tight protocols recommended in ‘best practice’ guidelines cause law enforcement 
agencies to shy away from using the methodology.  As a background to this argument, 
a digest of best practice guides is presented.   
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CHAPTER 4. 
THE ICONCACHE DATABASE 
 
Experimentation carried out during this research project led to the discovery of a 
previously undocumented resource in terms of digital forensic investigation.  This 
resource is the IconCache database, a hidden file which is created and maintained on 
computers running Windows operating systems. This chapter details the findings made 
in relation to the IconCache database (IconCache.db) and its usefulness to the digital 
forensic examiner, in particular when tracking activity from USB connectable devices 
which have been introduced to a Windows-based system by some user.  This makes 
the analysis of the IconCache.db an essential element of any investigation into the 
suspected use of vPCs.  As will be shown, the IconCache.db retains the names of 
program executables and their file paths, thus linking the associated activity to an 
individual user name on the computer under review.  
4.1 Background 
 
On Windows systems, programs, files and folders are represented by icons - small 
symbolic pictures which provide a visual clue to what may be accessed by clicking on 
them.  However, the desktop presented to the computer user would be impossibly 
cluttered if the system displayed every icon that it could.  Having to retrieve all 
possible icon images from disk and render them, time and again, would also consume 
system resources unnecessarily.  As a result, Windows systems save icons already 
retrieved e.g. from programs which run automatically at start, in a cache in memory  
(Holderness, 1999).  Before the introduction of Windows XP, the icons associated 
with processes and programs that either run in the background or are otherwise 




The maximum number of cached icons which could be cached in the ShellIconCache 






Valid values were: 100 - 4096  The Default value was: 500 
 
With the launch of  Windows XP, a new mechanism was introduced - the 
IconCache.db file.  The IconCache.db is created by Shell32.dll, a core system file 
which is responsible for a number of key operations when a Windows computer is 
running (Russinovich and Solomon, 2005).  The IconCache.db is a hidden file and 
Folder Options must be configured to show hidden files before it will be revealed to a 
computer user.  The file is stored in different locations, depending on the version of 
the host operating system.  For the purposes of the research discussed here, samples of 
three Microsoft Windows operating systems were examined: Windows XP, Windows 
Vista and Windows 7.  The operation of IconCache.db in Windows 8 lies outside of 
the scope of this enquiry however, it is noted that certain changes have been made to 
what the IconCache.db stores in this version of Windows.  
 
Caching mechanisms such as the IconCache database have been discussed by systems 
specialists in terms of their role in Windows memory management (Russinovich and 
Solomon, 2005).  However, the investigative potential of such mechanisms had not 
been explored before Collie (2013). 
 
This part of research project gives an overview of how the IconCache.db comes into 
being and how it accumulates artefacts of potential evidential interest.  A full 
explanation of the workings of the icon caching mechanism in Windows goes beyond 
the remit of this section of the research program.  The aim is chiefly to examine the 
artefacts produced and retained in the IconCache.db file when a USB device 
containing an executable file is connected to a Windows host.  The effects of 
introducing and running executable files from a DVD drive and from the host itself are 
also considered. 
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4.2 Synopsis of findings 
 
The IconCache.db is a hidden file stored in different locations, depending on the 
version of the operating system (OS).  Since a separate IconCache database is 
maintained for each named user of a computer, artefacts in this file can be attributed to 
a specific user account. 
 
If the IconCache.db file does not already exist on a Windows system, it is 
automatically created at system startup and populated with a number of default system 
icons. The cache of icons exists in memory but will also be written to disk following a 
Windows shutdown or restart.  
 
The IconCache.db grows as information is added to it by the processes and activities 
which occur on the machine. The changes which take place in the IconCache.db 
include both the addition of new visible icons and the addition of file paths to the 
programs or processes associated with those icons in the text portions of the data base.   
 
Of particular interest is the information which appears in the IconCache.db when a 
removable USB device or CD/DVD is connected to a host system and its contents are 
viewed.  If the removable media contains one or more executables at the root of the 
drive, then any associated icons are added to the database.  The file path, including the 
drive letter associated with the removable concerned, is also retained in the database in 
the following example format: 
E:\Program_Name.exe 
It should be noted that this action occurs whether any such executable is run or not, 
which means that readings obtained from the IconCache.db should be interpreted with 
care, ideally being corroborated against other findings.  Nevertheless, the database can 
be an useful aid to the digital analyst, especially where attempts have been made to 
conceal suspect activities, such as the use of a vPC, an external encryption program or 
the introduction of malware via some USB device or optical media.  Importantly, since 
these types of programs can be used on a computer without being installed, the 
IconCache.db may retain the only record of that activity.  
The IconCache.db can also help digital examiners in cases where a potentially suspect 
program e.g. Limewire has been installed on a system via removable media and later 
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uninstalled.  While few traces of that activity may remain on the host, a record, 
complete with textual details of both the origin of the installation and the path to its 
location on the host, will be kept by the database.  
In brief overview, the results from experimentation showed that for the operating 
systems under review: 
a)  The IconCache.db is:  
• Created on system reboot following a clean OS install 
• Altered on system restart  
• Recreated on system reboot, if deleted 
• Altered by creating a link to a Windows pre-loaded executable on the host 
desktop 
• Altered by running a Windows pre-loaded executable on the host 
• Altered by installing an executable from a DVD 
• Altered by inserting a USB connectable thumb drive which contains an 
executable 
• Altered by running an executable from a USB connectable thumb drive 
• Altered by opening a file e.g. text from a USB connectable thumb drive 
• Altered by writing a file out to a USB connectable thumb drive 
• Altered by creating a new user account on a system 
• Created for each individual user on a system 
 
b) When changes occur in the IconCache.db: 
• artefacts of potential evidential interest are viewable in Hex and readable in 
ASCII . 
• program icons new to the system e.g. from executables on external media, are 
stored in the database. 
• icons for .dll files extant on the host system are stored in the database once 
fetched by the system.  
 
c) Changes to the IconCache.db: 
• are shown in increased file size. 
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• affect the file’s Created/Modified/Accessed dates and times. 
 
d) Dates and times: 
• The ‘Created’ date and time of the IconCache.db file will reflect either: 
• the first date the file was ever created on the system i.e. after clean OS install 
and reboot 
• or the last ‘Modified’ date of the file,  where it has been deleted in a previous 
session and is then recreated by the computer when the system is rebooted. 
• The ‘Created’ date does not change when content is added during the duration 
of a user session. 
• The file’s ‘Modified’ dates reflect the time of the last system shut down. 
4.3 Research Method 
 
A formal test environment was established to ensure that the same experiment could 
be repeated consistently using the different versions of the Microsoft Windows 
operating system. The physical hardware used was a single PC workstation with an 
Intel Celeron 64 bit processor (E3400 @ 2.60 Ghz), 4 GB of RAM and a standard 
VGA card. The computer was not initially connected to any network. 
Two 250 GB hard disks were securely wiped (Table 2) and used interchangeably in 
the following way: Firstly, the test OS was installed and a single user account was set 
up on the system. Experimentation, data collection and analysis followed. To eliminate 
potential data contamination or inconsistency during operating system installation and 
use, the hard disks were wiped before first use and between all experimental phases. 
The primary operating systems tested were Windows XP Home (SP2), Windows Vista 
Home Basice (32 bit) and Windows 7 Home Premium (32 bit). Preliminary testing 
was also carried out on Windows 7 Home Premium (64 bit). 
In all cases, Windows was set up to run using UK English and with the time set to 
GMT London. To ensure consistency, a single user name and computer name was 
used throughout. 
The forensic tools used to conduct this research are summarized in Table 2, below.  
For each experiment, data was collected using a USB memory stick, formatted via 
Windows command line. 
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Table 2.  Forensic tools used during experimentation 
 
Hardware/software Purpose 
Logitech Talon a) Hard disk secure data deletion 
(WipeClean5 method) 
b) Write-blocked hard disk capture 
Wiebetech USB Writeblocker Write-blocked attachment of USB 
devices to a forensic workstation host. 
FTK Imager Lite by Access Data Imaging test USB devices. 
Forensic Tool Kit (FTK) v 3.1 & 3.2 by 
Access Data 
Analysis of data 
decWindows Thumbnail Database 
Viewer v. 1.8 by Dec Software6 




4.4  Experimentation 
 
Based on the common or expected functionality found across all the Windows 
operating systems, three experiment stages were derived. These were: the clean install 
of an operating system as a starting point to baseline the experiments, initial 
interaction with the operating system and finally the extended or repeated user activity. 
In accordance with these stages and the objectives of this research, the experiments 
summarized in Table 3 were formulated.  
 
Results from the experiments listed in Table 3 are summarized in the following 
sections.  In the interests of brevity, specific examples of findings recorded in this 
section relate to Windows XP only since the same basic behaviour patterns were 
observed during the experiments on Windows Vista and Windows 7 32 bit systems. 
 
                                                
5 Writes a pattern over the whole target drive 2x n+1 times where n is the selected number of iterations of all 0s 
and 1s.  The last pass then writes random values to every byte of the drive. (Source: Logicube Talon manual). 



















 A1  Ascertain: 
1. When the IconCache.db file is 
created. 
2. Its contents immediately 
following creation. 
3. Its contents following a system 
restart. 
4. What happens if the 
IconCache.db file is deleted 
 A2 Further research on 
IconCache.db to 
corroborate initial state. 
 
Ascertain: 
1. Assessment of IconCache.db 
default system icons 
immediately following creation. 
2. Review of default system icons in 
Shell32.dll 
B:   
Broad  empirical 
observation of the 




To investigate the 
effects of common user 








 B1 To investigate the 
effects of basic user 





1. IconCache.db contents after 
opening files & folders on the 
host system. 




on the desktop from a host-
based program. 
3. Its contents after running a host-
based executable. 
 
 B2 To investigate the 
effects of user initiated 
DVD activity. 
Ascertain: 
1. IconCache.db contents after loading 
a DVD containing an executable 
file into the host DVD tray. 
2. Its contents after installing a 
program on the host from a DVD. 
3. Its contents after running the newly 
installed executable from the host. 
 B3 To investigate the 
effects of connecting a 






1. IconCache.db contents following 
the connection of a clean USB 
thumb drive on the host.  
2. Its contents after connecting a USB 
drive containing files and folders 
only. 
3. Its contents after opening a file from 
a connected USB. 
4. Its contents after connecting a USB 
drive containing one or more 
executables. 
5. Its contents after an executable file 
is run from a thumb drive. 
  
B4 
Further research on 
IconCache.db to 
corroborate findings 
1. Creating a new user account 
2. File size changes for experiments in 
Set.  
3. Date and time changes for 





4.5 Icon caching mechanisms in Windows 
 
Holderness (1999) has observed that: ‘Every time the shell displays a folder full of 
files it needs to obtain icons for each of those items from somewhere... By saving 
icons that has already retrieved in a cache in memory, the shell is relieved of the need 
to constantly retrieve icons from disk.’  He also noted that, as well as caching icon 
information in memory, Windows systems attempt to save the information to disk 
before shutdown.  By this means, the cache persists from one session to another.   
At the time of writing his observations, Holderness was referring to Windows 
operating systems which existed at or before 1999.  Windows XP (32-bit) was not 
launched until 2001.  Previous to Windows XP, icons called by the system were stored 
in a hidden file at: 
C:/Windows/ShellIconCache 
With the introduction of Windows XP , the functionality of ShellIconCache was taken 
over by the IconCache.db file.  During this study, the baseline state of the 
IconCache.db was examined in order to establish its properties.  The object was to 
distinguish artefacts present in the file on its initiation from those created by user 
activities.   
4.5.1 Shell32.dll  
 
Much of the functionality of Windows operating systems and the programs run on 
these systems is provided by special files known as dynamic link libraries (DLL).  The 
use of DLLs helps both operating systems and programs to load and run more 
efficiently and therefore quickly (Microsoft, 2013).  Shell32.dll is the main kernel of 
the Windows OS.  It is a library which contains Windows Shell API (Application 
Programming Interface) functions, thus it is a core system file which is responsible for 
a number of key operations when a Windows computer is running. 
Shell32.dll is located at: 
C:\windows\system32\Shell32.dll 
As well as containing API functions, the file also contains a number of icons.  Tests 
carried out during this research showed that the Shell32.dll in Windows XP (32-bit) 
contained 306 icons, each of which exist in a number of versions and which have 
differing dimensions, numbers of colours and file sizes, as illustrated in Figures 11 and 
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12, below.  Shell32.dll creates the IconCache.db in memory following a clean OS 
install, as will be shown.  The database is written to disk on system halt or reboot. 
Figure 11:  Icons stored in Shell32.dll 
 




4.5.2 IconCache.db  
 
The IconCache.db is a hidden file and Folder Options must be configured to show 
hidden files before it will be revealed.   
4.5.2.1 Location 
 
Depending on the operating system, the IconCache.db may be located as follows: 
 
• Windows XP: C:\Documents and Settings\Username\Local 
Settings\Application Data\IconCache.db 
 





The IconCache.db is created by Shell32.dll and it will be initialised by the shell 
already containing a number of system icons. The number will vary depending on the 
operating system in use and the configuration settings chosen during its installation.  
For the systems tested during this research, using the settings described in 4.3, above, 
the numbers of icons present in the IconCache.db when first created were as 
documented in Table 4. 
Table 4 : Numbers of icons in the IconCache.db on first creation by version of 
Windows OS 
 
Windows Operating System Version Numbers of icons in 
IconCache.db on first creation of 
the file 
Windows XP Home Edition SP. 2 (32bit) 172 
Windows Vista Home Basic (32 bit) 426 
 




Windows Operating System Version Numbers of icons in 
IconCache.db on first creation of 
the file 




4.5.2.3 File signature 
 
The file signature for the IconCache.db appears to be consistent across Windows XP, 
Windows Vista and Windows 7 at offset 4 for four bytes, where the hexadecimal 
values: 57 69 6E 34, read as text: Win4, are recorded (Table 5).  However, variances 
in the IconCache.db are found to occur at the beginning of the file, at offsets 0, 8 and 
12 in the three versions of the operating system.  Examples are given in Table 6. 
Table 5: Basic file signature for IconCache.db in Windows XP, Vista and 7 
 
 
Signature offset Hex Text 
Offset 4 for 4 bytes 57 69 6E 34 Win4 
 




Operating System Offset 0 
For 1 byte 
Offset 8 
For 2 bytes 
Offset 12 
For 1 byte 
Hex Text Hex Text Hex Text 
Windows XP (32 bit) 
 
50 P 05  05 .. 54 T 
Windows Vista (32 bit) 40 @ 06 05 .. 71 q 
Windows 7 Home Premium 
(32 & 64 bit) 
 
40 @ 06 05 .. B0 ° 
Windows 7 Professional 
(64 bit) 
40 @ 06 05 .. B1 ± 
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4.6 Experimental results 
Results from the experiments listed in Table 3 are summarized in the following 
sections.  In the interest of brevity, specific examples of findings recorded in this 
section relate to Windows XP only, since the same basic behaviour patterns were 
observed during the experiments on Windows Vista and Windows 7 32-bit systems. 
4.6.1 IconCache.db baseline behaviour 
 
Conducting Experiment A from Table 3 for the Windows operating systems chosen 
for this research resulted in the following findings: 
i. The IconCache.db is not created during a clean install of the operating system. 
ii. The IconCache.db is created on system reboot following a clean OS install. 
iii. Where no user action apart from a system restart has taken place, an 
IconCache.db which contains a number of default system icon images is 
created (as shown in Figure 10.) 
iv. The numbers of icons present in the IconCache.db at creation may vary 
depending upon the operating system in use and the configuration settings 
chosen during installation.  
4.6.2 Abbreviated findings 
4.6.2.1 Initial creation of the IconCache.db 
 
Following a clean install of the Windows XP operating system, during which one user 
was set up on the system but no other action was taken apart from a system restart, an 
IconCache.db which contained 172 icon images was created (Table 4).   
 
When viewed using the forensic software, FTK, a listing of programs and processes 
associated with those icons was viewable in ASCII.   Example A, below, shows a 
sample start of the IconCache.db file, where references to shell32.dll is first 
noticeable, closely followed by the loading of Internet Explorer from the program files 
folder on the host hard drive, allocated letter C:, as is commonly the case. A record of 
other automatic processes which run on system restart comes next, with those which 
access the user’s documents and settings folder clearly shown.  Example B gives the 
end of the file for this sample and shows that certain executables, e.g. that for the 
solitaire game which forms part of the Windows install package, have been loaded.  
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The record: d:\setup.exe , is also visible.  This refers to the Windows XP executable, 
which has been run from the DVD drive, here allocated drive letter D: by the system. 




















4.6.2.2 Impact of second restart on the IconCache.db 
 
A second system restart, immediately following the first, added data to the 
IconCache.db file.  For instance, the fact that the logon screen had run was recorded 
by the “logon.scr” entry (Example C). 
Two conclusions were drawn from the findings in Examples B and C. Firstly, since 
this information did not exist in the IconCache.db at inception, it must have been 
added to the file during use of the system. Secondly, since the information was not 
visible in the database whilst the computer was running, it must have been added to 
the database on system shut down. 
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4.6.2.3 Impact of program use on the IconCache.db 
 
The listing of programs and processes in the IconCache.db was shown to grow as they 
were newly used, as did the number of associated icons retained.  This finding was 
corroborated by further tests to establish file size changes prompted by 
experimentation.  An example is given below.  Further examples may be found in 
Appendix IX.   It should be noted that in the following table (Table 7 ) and for all 
other examples produced, ‘Baseline IconCache.db’ indicates the properties of the .db 
file before the listed action was taken, not a virgin IconCache.db file. 
Table 7: Example result showing increase in file size and icons retained in 
IconCache.db resulting from user action 
 
Action Number of 




File size (Bytes) 
Baseline IconCache.db 181 n/a 2,149,330 
Create link to 
‘WordPad.exe’ on 
Desktop 
188 7 2,149,870 
Create ‘WordPad’ .txt 
file,  
save on Desktop 
189 1 2,149,994 
 
 
4.6.2.4 Replicating the effects of sample user actions on the IconCache.db 
 
4.6.2.4.1 The effects of introducing a DVD-based executable to the system 
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a) Loading a DVD containing an executable file. 
 
When a disk containing an application which had an ‘autorun’ icon was placed into the 
host’s DVD drive, that icon was stored in the IconCache.db .  Figure 13 illustrates 
how, when a disk containing the forensic software application ‘XWays’ was loaded, 
two ‘autorun’ icons (the same graphic presented in different resolutions) were stored 
in the IconCache.db.  The textual reading from the database, shows the presence of 
both of these (Example D).  It also shows that the path to the application, including the 
drive letter associated with the DVD drive was retained. 



















b) Installing an executable from a DVD 
 
When an application was installed on the host from an executable file on DVD, the 
icons for the application were stored in the IconCache.db.  The path to the executable, 
both on the DVD and in the ‘program files’ folder on the host’s C: drive, were also 
recorded in the file (Example E). 







c) Running an installed executable  
 
When the newly installed executable was then run on the host, a record this action was 
retained in the IconCache.db (Example F). 








4.6.2.3.2 The effects of USB device usage on the IconCache.db 
 
a) Opening a text file 
When a plain text file was opened from a memory stick, the IconCache.db recorded 
the running of both notepad.exe and wordpad.exe from the C: drive but did not retain 
the drive letter for the stick (Example G).  Icons for both programs were also stored in 
the database. 








b) Viewing a USB containing executable files 
 
When a USB memory stick containing an executable in the root of the drive was 
connected and viewed on the host, icons associated with that executable were stored 
in the IconCache.db despite the fact that it had not been run. As illustrated in Figure 
14 , in a test in which a USB with the integral encryption program, 
Flashlokv232.exe, was connected to the host, its icon was stored in the IconCache.db 
file (first icon, second row down).  The path to the associated executable files, 
together with the drive letter allocated to the USB stick, was also retained (Example 
H).  


















c) Running an executable file from USB 
When an executable was run from a USB drive, icons associated with it were stored in 
the IconCache.db.  In a test in which the forensic software FTK imager lite was run 
from a USB, two icons associated with it were shown in the IconCache.db.  The 
textual reading from the database showed that these were both recorded, along with 
the path to the executable (Example I). 
 








Significantly, for the overall research project, the same types of artefacts were created 
when a vPC was run from a USB drive.  For example, starting Ceedo Personal caused 
both the program icon and a textual record to be retained in the IconCache.db.  Further 
details are given in Chapters 5 and 6.      
 
d) Installing an executable from a USB 
 
When an executable was installed on a host from a USB drive, the icons associated 
with it were stored in the IconCache.db.  In a test involving the once popular peer-to-
peer application, Limewire, two instances of its executable icon and two associated 
setup icons were retained in the IconCache.db, (Figure 15).  The path to the executable 
on the USB, allocated letter ‘F:’ was also revealed in the ASCII (Example J). 
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Figure 15: Icons from Limewire application, installed from USB connectable & 




Example J: Executable installed from USB connectable & run on host shown 











e) Uninstalling an executable placed on the host via USB  
 
When the Limewire executable was subsequently deleted from the Windows host, 
using the program’s own uninstaller,  five icons related to it nevertheless remained in 
the IconCache.db, as shown in Figure 16  (icons 3 & 4 second row and 1, 2 & 3, third 
row). 
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4.6.2.4.3 Creating a new user on a computer 
 
When a new user was set up on the host machine, an IconCache.db for that user was 
created in their profile, separate to and different from the IconCache.db for the original 
user, as shown in the ASCII output in Example K.  The creation of the new user did 
not update the original user’s IconCache.db with any information about new user 
activity.  The original user’s IconCache.db was merely updated with a call to System 
32\mshta.exe.  This is a system file associated with the Microsoft HTML application 
host. 
Example K: First instance of IconCache.db for new user ‘Max’ 
 
shell32.dll/c:\program files\internet explorer\iexplore.exeGc:\documents and 
settings\max\start menu\programs\internet explorer.lnk*c:\program files\outlook 
express\msimn.exeEc:\documents and settings\max\start menu\programs\outlook 
express.lnk/c:\program files\internet  
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4.6.2.5 IconCache.db Date and Time information 
 
Changes in date and time stamps for the IconCache.db were recorded during 
experimentation. A sample is given in Table 8, below.  It was observed that, for the 
32-bit operating systems tested during this research: 
a) When the IconCache.db was deleted, it was recreated on system reboot with its 
original created date/time and with a modified time which reflected the time of 
its deletion.  This finding supports the supposition that the database is written 
to disk at system shut down or reboot.  
 
b) The IconCache.db file modification times were updated following actions 
which caused new information to be retained in it – the example chosen here 
was creating a text file and saving it to a USB memory stick.  
Table 8:  Sample Date and Time changes to the IconCache.db in Windows XP 
  
Action Created Modified 
First instance 
IconCache.db 




28/02/12 21.07 28/02/12 21.33 
Create .txt file, 
save to USB, 
restart 
28/02/12 21.07 28/02/12 21.12 
 
 
Preliminary testing on a Windows 7 Home Basic 64-bit installation produced a 
variation in results, as follows: 
a) When the IconCache.db was deleted, it was not immediately recreated on 
system re-boot.  In fact, no IconCache.db was apparent. 
b) A new IconCache.db was created following a second system reboot. It was 




However, further testing showed that this difference only occurred when the host was 
shut down by disconnecting the power cable from the back of the machine.  When the 
host was shut down normally, the IconCache.db was recreated in the same way as in 
32-bit Windows systems.  It was also found that, in common with the 32-bit systems 
examined, modification times for the IconCache.db were updated following actions 
which caused new information to be retained in it. 
4.7 Conclusions 
 
The IconCache.db is a hidden file which is created by Shell32.dll, a Windows system 
file which is loaded during the boot process.  The file is first created following a clean 
install and reboot containing a base number of icons, which varies depending on the 
version of the operating system in use and the settings chosen.  The IconCache.db 
exists in memory but is written to disk following a Windows shutdown (either manual 
or via the ‘Pull The Plug’ method) or restart.  The database regenerates itself from the 
information held on the computer system at shutdown when the system is restarted.  
Its persistence, plus the information that it retains in respect of program usage and 
installation, makes it a useful resource for the computer analyst. 
 
This research has shown that the IconCache.db not only stores system and program 
related icons but also a textual record of the activities which it facilitates.  These will 
include numerous user-initiated activities both on the host and peripherals attached to 
the host, such as DVD players and USB connectable devices.  This ability gives the 
IconCache.db the potential to inform and assist forensic investigation, particularly 
those involving the suspected use of a vPC.   
 
Where external media, such as DVDs and USB connectable devices have been 
introduced to the system, for example, artefacts retained in the IconCache.db can be 
especially useful in identifying executable files which either existed on them or were 
run or installed from them.  The ability to trace the installation or use of a foreign 
program to a USB connectable or other media can help to narrow down the search for 
a culprit.  It can also help suggest where other evidence might exist.  Care should be 
taken, however, in interpreting findings since the IconCache.db may contain the icons 
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of executables which were merely stored on a USB connectable, not actually run from 
it.  Opening and viewing the contents of a USB device which contains a program 
executable file will cause any related icon to be stored in the database.     
 
The information gleaned from the IconCache.db can be used to corroborate other 
findings, for instance artefacts remaining in the Registry, link files and log files.  It can 
be used to show that certain programs e.g. LimeWire existed and were used on a 
machine, even if those programs have been uninstalled.  Where an external encryption 
program has been used, it may provide the only indication.  Likewise where 
antiforensics have been used to clear information in registry keys. 
 
The IconCache.db contains a wealth of information including file paths to the 
programs and processes which have been invoked on fixed and attached drives.  Since 
an IconCache.db exists for each named user of a computer, the file paths also reveal 
which activities occurred under which user name.      
 
Further research is needed in order to gain a better understanding of the IconCache.db 
in terms of its structure and functionality.  This would greatly aid the interpretation of 
information to be found in the file.  An opportunity also exists to develop software 
capable of rendering icons stored in the database together with properly parsed date 
and time data.   
 
Further research is needed in order to clarify how the IconCache.db behaves both in 64 
bit versions of the Windows operating system and in Windows 8.  Initial 
experimentation with Windows 7 Home Premium 64 bit has indicated that, once 
created, the file stores artefacts associated with user-based computer activity in a 
similar way to the 32-bit operating systems which were tested during this research.  
Initial experimentation in Windows 8 has indicated that the IconCache.db no longer 
stores images of icons associated with applications which have been invoked at start 
time or run as a result of user activity. These are now stored at:  
USER\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer 
It does, however, retain a textual record of such activities, in the manner which has 
been observed in previous versions of Windows.  
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4.8 Chapter summary 
 
This Chapter has discussed the IconCache database and its potential as a resource for 
digital forensic examiners, especially where the unauthorized use of USB connectable 
devices is suspected.  This makes it an essential component of any investigation into 
the unauthorized use of vPCs.  It is shown that as well as storing system and program-
related icons, the IconCache.db also retains a textual record of the activities which it 
facilitates.  Of particular interest are the artefacts retained in the database as a result of 
user-initiated activity.  These include the names of executable files that were run or 
installed from external media and the associated file path.   
 
The ability to trace the installation or use of a foreign program such as a vPC to a USB 
connectable or other media is important during a digital forensic investigation.  The 
information could help to narrow down the search for a culprit.  It could also help 
suggest where other evidence might exist.  Care should be taken in interpreting 
findings, however.  For example, opening and viewing the contents of a USB device 
which contains a program executable file in the root of the drive will cause any related 
icon to be stored in the IconCache.db.  Thus the database  may contain the icons of 
executables which were merely stored on some attached media, not actually run from 
it.  
 
The IconCache.db contains a wealth of information including file paths to the 
programs and processes which have been invoked on fixed and attached drives.  Since 
an IconCache.db exists for each named user of a computer, the file paths also reveal 
which activities occurred under which user name.      
 
The information gleaned from the IconCache.db can be used to corroborate other 
findings, for instance artefacts remaining in the Registry, link files and log files.  It can 
be used to show that certain programs existed and were used on a machine, even if 
those programs have been uninstalled.  Where a vPC or another external software, for 
instance an encryption program, has been used it may provide the only indication.  
Likewise where antiforensics have been used from an external source to clear 
information in Registry keys. 
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 CHAPTER 5. 
EXPERIMENTAL METHOD, CONDUCT AND RESULTS 
 
This chapter describes the design and implementation of the experiments conducted 
during this research.  A set of initial experiments, designed to garner baseline results 
against which main test results are to be measured, are detailed. The effect of 
connecting the individual vPCs chosen for testing to Windows-based host systems and 
carrying out various user-initiated activities is then monitored and the results reported.      
5.1 Experimental method and conduct 
 
The design conditions for the experiments described in this section are detailed in 
Chapter 3 where a full account of the test environment and the hardware and software 
used during testing is also given.  The purpose of these experiments is to test the 
hypothesis of this thesis by: 
a) Creating a baseline dataset to act as a measure for experimental results.  This is 
achieved by:  
i. Identifying those artefacts which are created when a clean USB stick is 
introduced to a test Windows system. 
ii. Identifying those artefacts which are created when a USB stick 
containing a test vPC is introduced to a Windows system. 
iii. Identifying those artefacts which are created when a vPC is run on a 
Windows system. 
b) Isolating artefacts created by the active use of vPCs on test Windows systems.  
This is achieved by comparing the results obtained during a second set of 
experiments with those obtained during the initial set of experiments. 
5.1.1  Test system monitoring 
 
The utility Process Monitor v. 2.94 was pre-installed on a set of test hard drives before 
experimentation began.  The purpose of this was to audit any activity which occurred 
on the host system as a result of conducting the baseline experiments described below.  
The aim was to assemble a set of artefacts to act as a standard against which further 
experimental outputs would be measured.  Since Process Monitor records file system, 
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Registry, process, thread and DLL activity in real time, it was possible to investigate 
the behaviour of the individual vPCs, once introduced to the host, by analysing these 
records,.  It was therefore possible to gain an insight into which areas of the operating 
system would retain traces of vPC activity. 
5.1.2 RAM capture 
 
For each of the experiments listed below, RAM was captured before the system was 
terminated.  Once an experiment was complete, the computer was halted by pulling the 
plug from the back of the machine.  As explained in Chapter 2, this method was used 
in order to reproduce field conditions: when confronted with a running ‘suspect’ 
workstation, a digital forensic examiner will most commonly halt it in this way before 
commencing imaging.  The object of doing so is to prevent any changes from being 
made to the host system, so maintaining the integrity of the evidence captured. 
5.1.3 Control Experiment 
 
The first experiment carried out was a control experiment.  This involved introducing 
a clean USB key to a Windows XP 32-bit system.  The USB key had been wiped using 
the software Eraser v. 6.07.1893, which securely overwrites data several times.  The 
key was then reformatted FAT32 using Windows.   
 
Process Monitor was set to run before the USB key was inserted into the host machine.  
Outputs from the software clearly showed the enumeration process, which occurs 
automatically on Windows systems, taking place.  During enumeration, a USB 
connectable drive is allocated a drive letter and the host system sends a number of 
queries to the drive.  Amongst other things, these queries elicit a creation time for the 
volume, its serial number and its label.  As shown by Carvey (2009) and discussed in 
Chapter 2, this information is stored in a key which is then created in the HKEY local 
machine/System portion of the Registry. 
 
As a result of this experiment, a list of events which occur when a USB key is 
connected to a Windows host was drawn up.  This was used as the minimum set of 
events which could be expected to occur during further experimentation.  By 
comparing this set of results with those obtained from Process Monitor after 
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introducing a test vPC to a host, it was possible to isolate activity initiated by the vPC 
and thus derive a Data Set Of Interest (DSOI) which was then used for the analysis 
and comparison of results.  
5.2.  Initial analysis 
 
A brief analysis of the file system structures for each vPC  was conducted in order to 
gain some basic background knowledge on the various folders and their contents with 
the object of gaining a better understanding of the outputs reported by Process Monitor 
during experimental testing.  The analysis was done by viewing the software in the 
forensic tool FTK Imager 3.1.1.8.  Commentaries and screen shots follow. 
5.2.1 MojoPac file structure  
 
MojoPac’s file structure appeared to mimic that of the Windows operating system, 
complete with folders for Program Files, Documents and Settings etc., as shown in 
Figures 17 a) & 17 b), below: 
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5.2.2 Ceedo file structure 
 
Ceedo’s file structure included folders for ‘Program Files’ and ‘Program Files (x64)’ 
as well as a ‘Windows’ folder (Figures 18 a) & 18 b)) .  There was a ‘User’ folder 
containing subfolders related to installed applications. (Figure 18 c)) and a ‘My 
Documents’ folder for the storage of user created files. 
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5.2.3 LupoPenSuite file structure 
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LupoPenSuite had a folder for installed applications and a ‘MyFiles’ folder within 
which a user could store various types of files. (Figure 19). 
 
 




5.2.4 PortableApps file structure 
 
The PortableApps file structure appeared similar to that of LupoPenSuite.  There was a 
‘Documents’ folder for user files and  ‘PortableApps” folder containing various 
installed applications e.g. Firefox Portable (Figure 20).  





5.3.  Baseline Experiments 
Baseline experiments were conducted for each combination of vPC and test OS, as 
follows: 
a) Introduce USB key containing vPC executable into the host system, no 
further action. 
b) Introduce USB key containing vPC executable into the host system.  Run 
vPC.  
As explained in 5.1, above,  the aim was to identify a baseline dataset to act as a 
measure for the second set of experimental results.   
5.3.1 Baseline experiments – results  
 
A full set of results for the baseline experiments conducted on MojoPac and Ceedo 
Personal in Windows XP 32 bit are given below.   These were obtained by analysing 
the test hard drives used during experimentation, as indicated in Chapter 3.  Following 
analysis, it was found that the results obtained on Windows XP 64 bit systems were 
very similar to those obtained on 32 bit versions of the same OS.   
 
A summarised report of the results obtained for baseline experiment testing on 
LupoPenSuite and PortableApps follows at the end of this section.  
 




i) Process Monitor (PM) identified changes in the Registry as a result of 
connecting the USB key.   As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the Windows 
operating system automatically runs an enumeration process when a USB 
device is connected.  The information gathered during this process is used to 
populate keys in the Registry.  The basic process is simplified in Figure 21, 
below. Thus, the outputs from PM showed the host system querying the USB 
key for various pieces of information e.g. the volume serial number, label, its 
creation date and time and its last access, write and change dates and times 
(Appendix X a)).  The key was labelled ‘MOJO’ and this was clearly reported.  
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A ‘setup’ executable was looked for but not found.  The MojoPac installer 
executable, was found, however, and this was reported. 







Other results of interest in the data set were as follows: 
a) the dates and times recorded for the ‘setup’ executable were all 01/01/1601 at 
01:00:00 – this is the epoch date used by Windows NTFS 32 & 64 bit systems.   
The USB memory sticks used for testing were formatted in the FAT 32 file 
system. The timestamps recorded for the ‘setup’ executable’ here most 
probably came about when zero-value DosDATE timestamps on the FAT 
device were converted to the  FILETIME format on connection to the host. 
b) the ‘Created’ and ‘LastWrite” dates and times recorded for the Mojopac 
installation executable were15/10/2008, the date when the Mojopac program 
was expanded onto the USB key upon which it was held.  The ‘Last Access’ 
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time was 22/09/2014, the date when the last test was run.  The ‘Change’ date 
remained 01/01/1601. 
c) Artefacts were present on the host in captured RAM (Appendix X d) ).  No 
specific references to MojoPac were found in Registry keys, however both the 
related icon and textual references to the executable file were to be found in the 
IconCache.db for the single named user of the host following system restart.   
(Figure 22).  
Figure 22: MojoPac icon in IconCache.db textual reference 
 
c:\windows\system32\spider.exeRc:\documents and settings\all users\start 
menu\programs\games\spider solitaire.lnk c:\windows\explorer.exe 
c:\windows\system32\logon.scr c:\windows\system32\mydocs.dll shell32.dll 
c:\windows\explorer.exe c:\windows\system32\mshtml.dll/c:\program files\internet 
explorer\iexplore.exe c:\windows\system32\url.dll shell32.dll e:\mojopacinstaller.exe 
e:\mojopacinstaller.exe Ŀāŋāğāčā ŧāıāĕā ſāňāĜāČā ŠāİāĒā űāĿāěā 




i. Process Monitor identified a large amount of activity which was caused by 
running MojoPac.  Both the name of the program executable and related 
software e.g. Ringthree - part of the MojoPac virtualisation package - were 
found to be associated with the drive letter allocated to the USB which 
contained the vPC. (Appendix X b)) 
ii. An analysis of the host hard drive found that a large number of artefacts had 
been retained by the system, both in live and deleted space.  Sample results are 
given in (Appendix Xc) ).  It was also shown that a batch file named 
“_R3Cleanup_.bat” had been run automatically, apparently with the intention 
of wiping traces of MojoPac usage, as follows: 
 
"C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\__R3Cleanup__.exe" /gd:E: E:\ %1 %2 %3 
%4 %5  
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 IF ERRORLEVEL 9 GOTO END  
 IF "%1" == "keep" GOTO END  
 del "C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\__R3Cleanup__.exe"  
 del "C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\reconFigureexe"  
 del "C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\cmojo.exe"  
 del "C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\dne-fastuninstall.bat"  
 del "C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\ciscoipsec-fastuninstall.bat"  
 del "C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\__R3Cleanup__.bat"  :END 
 














i. An analysis of the host Registry found that artefacts had been retained in the 
NTUser.dat file at the MUICache key located at: 
Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\MuiCache.  (Appendix X d) ). An 
executable named ‘Start.exe’ was shown as having run from a connectable 
drive at drive letter: E.  An executable named ‘Ringthreemainwin32.exe’ was 
also shown as having run from drive letter E:.   Both of these were also 
referenced in the IconCache database (see item v), below).  As mentioned in 
item i) above, Ringthree  is part of the MojoPac virtualisation package. 
ii. Artefacts were present on the host both in captured RAM and the Pagefile 
(Appendix X e); Appendix X f)). 
iii. Running MojoPac caused references to be created in the IconCache.db for the 
named user ‘Jan’ (Figure 23).  These referred to two executables, one named: 














5.3.2 Ceedo Personal baseline experiments - results 
 
a) Introduce USB key containing Ceedo executable file.   
 
i) PM identified changes in the Registry as a result of connecting the USB key.   
The outputs showed the host system querying the USB key for the volume 
serial number, label, its creation date and time and its last access, write and 
change dates and times.   During the enumeration process, the initial dates and 
times recorded for the USB key Volume Creation was: 01/01/1601.  The Last 
Access date was 28/08/2014 – the last time the key was used.  The last write 
time was 05/08/2013 – the last time a file was saved to the key.  The key was 
labelled ‘CEEDO’ and this was clearly reported. (Appendix XI a)).  
ii) Five executable files and a number of folders e.g. ‘Program Files’ and ‘My 
Documents’ were found to be associated with drive letter E:, which had been 
allocated to the USB containing the vPC. (Appendix XI a)). 
iii) Artefacts were present on the host in captured RAM (Appendix XI b) ). 
iv) No references to Ceedo were found in the Registry keys designated for 
checking (See Appendix VII).  No reference to the executable files referenced 
by PM were to be found in the IconCache.db following system restart. 
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i) Process Monitor identified a range of activity which was caused by running 
Ceedo. Notably, whilst the drive containing the program was allocated 
letter E: and this can be plainly seen, numerous responses to the Host 
queries which are run across the USB key reference data at drive letter  G:  
(Appendix XI c)). 
ii) Artefacts were present on the host in captured RAM (Appendix XI d)). 
iii)  In the Registry, artefacts were retained in the NTUser.dat file at the 
MUICache key:  Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\MUICache 
Readings here showed the executable starting followed by the integral 
‘SmartPlayer’ application, as follows:  
G:\Ceedo\Ceedo\SmartPlayer\napplay.exe 
A screenshot of this activity forms Appendix XI e). 
iv) An analysis of the host hard drive found that numerous artefacts had been 
retained by the system, up to and including a reference to Ceedo 
Technologies Ltd’s base address in Rosh Haayin, Israel.  Sample results are 
given in (Appendix XI f )). 
v) Monitoring with PM picked up references to the Ceedo application located 
on: 
\DEVICE\	HARDDISK1\DP(1)0-0+5\	
in the Prefetch  record:   
[root]/WINDOWS/Prefetch/CEEDO.EXE-1539FA3E.pf	
(Samples are shown Appendix X f).)  Whilst a ‘Ceedo.exe’ prefetch record 
was retained on the host, it did not reveal that location, referring only to 
the host hard drive:  
\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\	
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vi) Running Ceedo caused references to be created in the IconCache.db for the 
named user ‘Jan’.  These referred to five executables related to the Ceedo 
program e.g. startceedo.exe’, and ‘foudme.exe’.  (Figure 24).   












5.3.3 LupoPenSuite and PortableApps baseline experiments – results 
 
Conducting Baseline tests a) and b) on LupoPenSuite and PortableApps produced the 
following summarised results: 
 
Test a) 
For both LupoPenSuite and PortableApps , artefacts naming the vPCs were found in 












Nothing to identify the two pieces of software was retained in the Registry or in the 
IconCache database after system restart.   
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The volume labels for both vPCs were marked with the names of the software and 
these were reported by PM.   
   
Test b) 
When running LupoPenSuite and PortableApps, the names of the vPC software 
packages were reported by PM (Appendix XII).  In the case of LupoPenSuite, the 
names of further programs contained within the vPC e.g. CCleaner, were identified by 
PM (Appendix XII a).  In the case of PortableApps, PM picked up references to 
E:\setup.exe  and ‘E:\Autorun.inf’, both of which are associated with the software   
(Appendix XII c)).  For both vPCs, artefacts identifying the software were retained in 





In common with findings made in respect of MojoPac and Ceedo during these 
experiments, references to the program executable files for both LupoPenSuite and 
PortableApps were found in the IconCache.db for the named user on the Host 
following system restart. No references to any hard disk other than the host hard disk 
were found either during monitoring with PM or subsequent analysis of the host.  
5.4 Test scenario Experiments 
5.4.1 Test scenarios 
 
The following test scenarios were envisaged with the aim of replicating the types of 
activity that, in the view of the author, a vPC user would likely wish to carry out once 
having gained access to a host machine. Each of the activities listed were carried out 
for each test vPC application in the context of each test operating system.  
 
1. Copy a text file ; vPC to host. 
2. Copy a text file ; host to vPC. 
3. Copy a picture file: vPC to host 
4. Copy a picture file; host to vPC 
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5. Write and save a text file on the vPC. 
6. Run a program executable on the vPC. 
7. Launch a browser on the vPC. 
8. Conduct a search from a vPC-based browser. 
Since MojoPac v.2.1.1.0 tested incompatible with Windows 7, experimentation on this 
vPC was limited to Windows XP professional.  All of the other test results which 
follow were recorded on Windows 7 Professional 32 bit systems using Ceedo Personal 
v. 5.0.1.7, PortableApps v.11.2 and Lupo PenSuite v. 2013.04_Lite. Identical 
procedures were followed in every case.   
In the interests of brevity, only the most noteworthy results are recorded in the 
following sections. 
5.4.2 Tests 1 - 4 
 
Using copy and paste, when either a text file or a picture file was copied from the host 
to the vPC, no artefacts which pointed to this action having happened were apparent in 
the key system areas chosen for scrutiny on static systems although the ‘Accessed’ 
date/time of the file copied from the host was altered.  When a text or picture file was 
copied from the vPC to the host, no artefacts to show the source drive or vPC were 
apparent in the key areas examined.  However, the ‘Modified’ date and time of the file 
preceded the ‘Created’ and ‘Accessed’ dates and times.  This type of finding 
commonly indicates that a file has been created on some device other than the host and 
has been transferred from an external drive to the host.   
 
During testing on MojoPac, it was noted that when the vPC is running, it is allocated 
drive letter C:.  On a host with one partition, the host drive was not accessible from 
within the MojoPac environment.  Transferring files from vPC to host via copy and 
paste was not supported.  It was possible to right click a file on the host and choose the 
‘Send to’ option, thus transferring it to the MojoPac environment.  No artefacts were 
found on the host as a result of this action.  On a host with two partitions it was 
possible to copy a file directly from the MojoPac user’s ‘Documents’ folder to the host 
hard drive and vice versa.  The sole artefact recovered following a copy-paste action 
from vPC to host was retained in the StreamsMRU key on the host, which contained 
the following data: 
 95 
G:\Documents and settings…..RINGCUBE 
The name of the document was not revealed. 
 
In all cases, following experiments 1 - 4, the names of the files copied between host 
systems and vPCs during testing were found to be present in live memory dumps but 
there was no clear indications as to where the files had been copied to or from.  No 
artefacts were found in the pagefile.       
5.4.3 Test 5 
 
MojoPac allows a full application to be installed within the vPC environment.  For this 
experiment, Microsoft Word 2003 had been preloaded onto the vPC.  No version of 
Word existed on the host.  Word was launched and used to create and save a document 
within the vPC.   No artefacts to suggest that a document had been created and saved 
within MojoPac were found.   
For Ceedo, LupoPenSuite and PortableApps, Notepad ++ was used to write and save a 
text document within the vPC.  The results monitored showed that for all these vPCs, 
evidence that Notepad ++ had been run from within the named vPC on an external 
drive was held in the UserAssist key (Figure 25.). The name of the document which 
had been created was not discernible when using Ceedo Personal.  However, for both 
PortableApps and LupoPenSuite, artefacts were found.  In both cases, the named file 
could clearly be identified as existing within the program’s ‘Documents’ folder on the 
external drive both within the Registry’s ComDlg32 key  (Figure 26) and in an 
associated .lnk file.  
Figure 25: Use of Notepad ++ from within Ceedo Personal identified in the 






Figure 26: Create and save of a document within PortableApps identified in 
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5.4.3 Test 6 
 
When a program executable was run from within a vPC,  in the case of MojoPac 
alone, no artefacts to suggest that the action had occurred were visible either in the 
host’s Registry or the IconCache.db.  For all the other vPCs under consideration, 
evidence that a program executable had been run was recorded in the UserAssist 
Registry key.  Where the deletion software ‘Eraser’ was started from within 




As was found during baseline experimental testing, icons for the parent vPC 
executable programs under examination were retained in the IconCache.db, along with 
textual records.  However, icons for programs run from within the vPC environments. 
such as Eraser and Notepad++,  were not recorded.  No artefacts were apparent in the 
pagefile. 
5.2.4 Test 7  
 
When the browser Firefox Portable was launched on test vPCs, a record of the 
executable having run on the external drive was retained in the UserAssist key when 

















In the case of PortableApps, further artefacts were found the \Explorer\Software key in 
the user’s NTUser.dat file.  Running the browser in PortableApps also resulted in 
deleted folders being kept on the host system which were clearly viewable in forensic 
software (Figure 27).  No data was retained in the deleted folders.   






5.4.5  Test 8 
 
The browser preloaded in Ceedo was Firefox rather than Firefox Portable.  It was 
found that an uninstall record was left in the UserAssist key after running the browser 
from within the tool and closing out of the vPC, as follows: 
 
E:\Ceedo\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\uninstall\helper.exe 
 
The browser preloaded in MojoPac was Explorer.  No evidence to suggest that the 
browser had been used was found on the host.   
 
Search terms were entered into each browser on each vPC after connecting the host 
system to the internet.  No artefacts identifying the search terms used were found on 
the host systems during static analysis. Testing with PM indicated that internet usage 
data were written back to the vPCs themselves and analysis using IEF v.6.3.2  showed 
this to be the case: the search terms were located within the vPC volumes. 
5.4.6 Tests in Windows 7 64-bit 
 
For all the Windows 7 compatible vPCs tested, experimental results indicated that 
artefacts were retained in a similar way to 32-bit systems. i.e. the same Registry keys 
were populated with information, as were other areas selected for investigation, for  
example prefetch files and the IconCache.db.   Additional findings of interest included 
the following: for Ceedo Personal, on opening the program, artefacts were retained 
both in the MountPoints2 key within the user’s NTUser.dat file and in the 
IconCache.db. Use of the program Notepad++ was also shown in the UserAssist key 
but use of Firefox was not.  No trace of a document created and saved within the 
software was apparent in the Registry. However, a keyword search for the text files 





The content of this file requires further in-depth analysis but it seems to associate the 
two text files with the writing package used to create them  (Notepad++ ) within 
Ceedo at drive letter E:.  In the following extract (Figure 28), the file copied Host to 
vPC was ‘StateSecret.rtf’ and the file copied vPC to Host was ‘MyHakz.txt’. 









The final line of this extract is encoded Rot13 and translates as: 
E:\Ceedo\Program Files\Notepad++\notepad++.exe 
 
This value matched that found in the UserAssist key following this experiment. 
5.5  Further results 
 
As a further result of the experiments carried out, it was also possible to draw up a 
table of useful search terms for each vPC tested.  These terms, which revealed 
artefacts present in both live and unallocated space, are given in Table 9. 
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5.6  Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has detailed a range of experiments which have been conducted in order 
to monitor the effect of connecting USB-bound vPCs to Windows XP and Windows 7 
host systems and carrying out various user-initiated activities.   The utility Process 
Monitor was used to audit the activity which occurred, initially by introducing four 
test vPCs to a host, then by introducing the test vPCs to a host and running them. The 
results from these baseline tests were compared against those obtained from a control 
experiment in which a virgin USB stick was introduced to a host.  A data set of 
interest was thus derived.   
Further experimentation then took place in which a number of activities e.g. copying 
and pasting a file, writing and saving a document, were carried out using the test vPCs.  
For every experiment, a RAM dump was taken before system close. This was 
inspected for findings of potential interest, as was the test host hard drive during 
subsequent static analysis.     
It was found that, for the systems tested, connecting a vPC to a Windows hosts can 
create numerous artefacts of interest to digital forensic examiners.  The most 
informative of these will be found in Registry keys as well as in Link files / Shortcuts, 
Prefetch and the IconCache database.  At a minimum, analysis of these artefacts will 
enable an enquirer to establish the name of the vPC environment invoked, the user 
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name under which it was introduced to the host and which programs were run from 
within it, together with relevant dates and times, the drive letter allocated to the 
containing USB key plus details enabling identification of that key, such as the make 
and serial number.  All of this information is available when a computer has been 
closed down using the traditional ‘pull the plug’ method.  The pagefile may be a 
further resource on static systems.  Where the collection of live memory is possible, 
this can reveal the names of files copied between a vPC and the host although file 
paths may not be available.  However, for some vPCs, the names of files created and 
saved within the miniature environment are retained on the host, together with the file 
path.  Folders temporarily created on the host when a portable browser is used from a 
vPC and which are afterwards automatically deleted may also be visible within 





ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
6.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews the analysis of data reported in Chapter 5 and discusses the 
findings, from which conclusions are drawn.  The modus operandi is that of a digital 
forensic examination which occurs after a suspected breach of data security where the 
perpetrator is thought to be a member of staff working at the target organisation’s 
premises.  The type of organisation envisaged is the small to medium enterprise where 
computer network activity is not continually monitored using specialist software.  
Where IT staff are employed, these are primarily engaged in keeping the network 
available for use, observing user behaviour only when some unusual event occurs e.g. 
suspected data compromise. 
 
The discussion points presented here centre around the artefacts which were either 
discovered during analysis or not discovered, despite a reasonable expectation that 
they might be present on a host system following the experimental actions taken.  
Possible reasons as to why such artefacts were created and retained, or not, are 
explored.  The intention is not to offer a comprehensive reference work which 
identifies every Registry hive or other potential repository of artefacts on Windows 
computers which may be of investigative interest.  Instead, the aim is to justify the 
hypothesis of this thesis by demonstrating that it is possible, using the methods 
described in preceding chapters, to extract and analyse artefacts of potential evidential 
interest from system files that have been created on Windows hosts by miniature 
computing environments running from USB devices.  
6.2  Baseline test results. 
6.2.1 Baseline Test a), ‘Standard practice’ analysis 
 
A number of initial steps are undertaken when a digital forensic examiner suspects that 
an unauthorised USB device or devices may have been connected to a host system.  
These steps were followed during the analysis of baseline test results. 
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The majority of modern USB connectable devices are ‘plug and play’ (PnP) 
compatible.  That is, they come to the marketplace complete with the driver files 
needed to make them work on Windows computers. As noted in Chapters 2 and 5, the 
Windows operating system queries a connected device during installation.  The query 
process elicits information from the USB device such as its particular ID, serial 
number, make, manufacturer etc.  These events are recorded by the host system in 
specific files e.g. setupapi.log and certain keys are created and populated in the 
Registry.  A drive letter is allocated to the connected device and it is made available to 
the user. 
 
As was found during initial experimentation when Process Monitor was used to record 
activity on test systems, in every case where a vPC was attached to a host machine, 
Windows ran the enumeration process, eliciting information about the container USB 
stick.  This action caused data to be retained in the Registry at:  
 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet00x\Enum\USBSTOR 
      “                   “          \SYSTEM\ControlSet00x\Enum\USB 
 
In every case, it was thus possible to discover that a USB memory stick had been 
introduced to the host,  the make and model of that device, its serial number and its 
unique ID.  Also, in every case it was possible to discover the drive letter which was 




Since this value is repeated in the ntuser.dat hive of the user profile under which the 
action of connecting the USB drive is taken, it was possible to link the two pieces of 
data.  Furthermore, the date and time of first connection of the test devices could be 
verified by analysing the setupapi.dev.log in Windows XP and setupAPI.dev.log and 
setupapi.app.log in Windows 7, as would be expected during a standard digital 
forensic investigation. 
6.2.2  Baseline Test a), IconCache.db analysis 
 
A new technique for investigating the connection of USB devices plus the presence 
and potential use of program executable files from such devices has been developed 
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during this research.  This technique centres around analysis of the IconCache 
database.   
 
As explained in Chapter 4, the IconCache.db is a hidden file which is created and 
maintained on computers running Windows operating systems.  The file not only 
stores icons associated with any programs which are invoked on a Windows host, it 
also stores icons associated with any programs which are invoked from a connected 
drive.  A textual record is kept of these activities and since separate IconCache records 
are kept for each named user of a computer, artefacts in this file can be attributed to a 
specific user account. 
 
During baseline experimental testing for Set a) it was found that the IconCache.db can 
retain icons from programs which exist on a USB drive but have not been used.  This 
proved to be the case with MojoPac, for example.  Attaching a USB containing this 
vPC resulted in a record being kept although the software had not actually been run.  
6.2.3  Baseline Test a), RAM & Pagefile analysis 
 
RAM was captured after conducting each experiment and the Pagefile was analysed 
for relevant artefacts.  For all vPCs, references to the named software could be gleaned 
from RAM together with the allocated drive letter.  No artefacts were discovered in the 
Pagefile after completing Test a) for each vPC.        
 
• Summary Result 
This research has shown that: 
a) connecting a vPC to a Windows host does not preclude the operating system 
from running the enumeration process for USB connectable drives.  
Information which helps to identify the drive containing the vPC is therefore 
stored in the Registry.  
b) Existing analysis techniques for static hard drives can be used to locate this 
information plus the dates and times of suspect device connection. 
c) The IconCache.db can retain artefacts of potential evidential interest and is 
therefore a useful new resource. 
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d) The analysis of RAM has limited potential under these test conditions.  
Analysis of the Pagefile may not add to the enquiry.   
6.2.4 Baseline Test b), ‘Standard practice’ analysis 
 
A number of Registry keys or ‘hives’ are automatically populated when a USB device 
is connected to a Windows system, as has been discussed above.  Any further action 
taken – in the case of Test b), running a program executable – may cause other 
artefacts to be created in the Registry.   Starting a new application, for example, should 
populate the UserAssist key and MUICache key.  These are located in the 













The UserAssist key keeps a record of the applications which have been launched on a 
system, the number of times those applications have been launched and associated 
date and time data.  However, none the vPCs tested created artefacts in this key when 
the executable files were run.  
 
Similarly, a record is also created in the MUICache key when new applications are 
started although date and time values are not retained. During experimentation it was 
found that, in every case, launching a vPC did populate this key.    
 
Outside of the Registry, the prefetch folder would be expected to retain a record of any 
programs which may have been run on a Windows system.  The mechanism, which 
saves information as a number of small files, is intended to help speed the computer 
start-up process.   Analysis carried out on test hard drives after experimentation 
showed that prefetch records which identified the vPCs in use did exist after running 
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the software.  Interestingly, the record created by using MojoPac showed the host 
recognizing the vPC as a ‘hard disk’.  This was indicated by the instruction:     
\DEVICE\HARDDISK1\DP(1)0-0+5\ 
 
This instruction is intended to help the host to map events to the correct volume.  
According to Microsoft (2015) 7, the drive type indicated here is a CD Rom (Type 5) 
rather than a removable drive (Type 2).   
 
Monitoring with PM showed that Ceedo identified itself as existing on a Type 5 
volume in the same way and a prefetch record revealing that location was retained.  
Monitoring LupoPenSuite and PortableApps with PM did not produce the same 
finding - no reference to either vPC as existing on an external ‘hard disk’ or device 
was discovered during analysis.   
 
In a scenario where a digital forensic examiner had checked both the Registry and the 
prefetch folder and therefore established the name of any vPC which may have been 
used on a host, the examiner might then be likely to sweep the host drive for any other 
references to the vPC and associated software.  This could be achieved by indexing the 
hard drive and searching for specific known terms.  As has been shown, a large 
number of artefacts would be found in allocated and unallocated space to help to 
confirm and/or flesh out previous findings. 
 
A further standard method of analysis would be to check through a listing of .log files 
and .exe files.  This could identify unusual or unexpected data.  Checking .bat files – 
an activity usually carried out where virus infection or hacking attempts are suspected 
- would also be advisable.  Launching MojoPac, for example, caused the 
‘R3Cleanup_.bat’ to be run, leaving artefacts on the host. 
6.2.5  Baseline Test b), IconCache.db analysis 
 
Running all test vPCs resulted in artefacts being retained in the IconCache.db.  Apart 
from MojoPac, the action of running a vPC was the first to cause artefacts to be 
created in the database.  It has been shown that the MojoPac icon can appear in the 
                                                
7 http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394173(v=VS.85).aspx 
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IconCache.db even when the software has not been launched, however the textual 
record will only refer to the program’s installer executable.  Running MojoPac 
resulted in more information being written to IconCache.db.  The ‘start’ executable 
was shown to have run, as was the ‘ringthreemainwin32’ executable.  These findings 
correlate with those found in the MUICache key, verifying that these activities 
occurred.   
For Ceedo, the textual record in the IconCache could also be compared with findings 
in MUICache, where four related executables were shown to have run.  Notably, 
however, the drive letters for the activity were different in the two records. During this 
experiment, monitoring with PM showed the USB containing Ceedo being allocated 
drive letter E: whereas other queries made by the operating system during enumeration 
of the drive referenced drive letter G:.  The record retained in IconCache.db in respect 
of executable files linked with Ceedo consistently referenced drive E: the record 
retained in MUICache for matching executable file names referenced drive G:  Further 
research would be needed in order to ascertain why this occurred.  Nevertheless, the 
activity can be cross-referenced between the two records.  Where, for example, in the 

















While the ‘napplay.exe’ , which is associated with Ceedo’s ‘SmartPlayer’ programme 
was not directly referenced in the IconCache.db, the line: E:\ceedo\ceedo\ceedoico.dll’ 
was present and would appear to refer to the ‘SmartPlayer’ activity recorded in 
MUICache.  This can be surmised from the MUICache record, since activities are 
ordered as they occur, the most recent activity being the last record shown in the key’s 
listing.  The IconCache.db also appears to record activities in order of occurrence.  As 
noted in Chapter 4, previous research on the IconCache.db has found that the names of 
executable files present on attached drives may be recorded in the artefact if those 
executable files exist in the root of the drive.  The names of executable files found in 
the IconCache.db but not shown in MUICache following this experiment were located 
in the root of the drive (Figure 29) .  Where the name of an executable file is found 
both in the IconCache.db and in MUICache, one can infer, from this finding, that it 
has run.  Uncertainty would remain about the other executables named in the 
IconCache – certain malware may be capable of running from an attached drive 
without leaving a trace in MUICache, for example.  Further testing would be required 
in order to research this possibility.             
 








6.2.6  Baseline Test b), RAM & Pagefile analysis 
 
For all vPCs, references to the main executable for the named software were found in 
RAM together with associated drive letters allocated to the containing drives. Activity 
occurring automatically e.g. the launch of ‘SmartPlayer’ following the launch of the 
Ceedo executable was discernable.  Readings were difficult to interpret for MojoPac 
as the vPC allocates itself drive letter C: .  Since MojoPac has its own Registry and 
other Windows operating system features, activity attributed to drive letter C: might 
refer to events occurring on the host or to events occurring in the MojoPac 
environment.  Nevertheless, it was possible to associate the vPC with the drive letter 
allocated to its containing drive, E:.   
For MojoPac alone,  artefacts were discovered in the Pagefile after Test b).  While this 
result was disappointing, the results which might be obtained from a computer in 
every-day use could be much more informative.  It should be noted that the host 
systems used during experimentation were running the native OS alone; no 
applications had been installed.  This would mean that limited demands were being 
made upon memory.  Also the systems were only run for short periods, therefore there 
was little time for artefacts to accumulate in the pagefile.  Analysis of the pagefile in a 
real-life investigation, where a suspect computer would be highly likely to have 
multiple applications installed and would have been active for many months or years 
should therefore be considered worthwhile. 
• Summary Result 
This research has shown that: 
a) Running a vPC on a Windows host will cause numerous artefacts to be created 
on the host. These will be retained in allocated and unallocated space and may 
be discovered using existing analysis techniques for static hard drives. 
b) Artefacts of potential evidential interest will be created in the IconCache.db.  
Readings obtained from this file can be compared with those obtained from 
the MUICache key in the Registry, helping to identify what programs have 
been run from a vPC. 
c) The analysis of RAM can also help to identify activity which has taken place 
as a result of running a vPC on a Windows host. 
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d)  Analysis of the Pagefile may result in findings, this avenue of enquiry is 
therefore worthwhile. 
6.3 Scenario-based experimental results. 
6.3.1 Copy and paste a text or picture file (Experiments 1 – 4). 
 
Save for MojoPac, copying and pasting test files from vPC to host did not create any 
unique artefacts on the host. Copying and pasting a file from one volume to another 
will not create a link (.lnk) file.  A link file is only created when a file is opened on or 
from some source.  For this experiment, therefore, the absence of .lnk files was not 
surprising. As noted in Chapter 5, however, the ‘Modified’ date and time of files 
copied from a vPC to the host preceded the ‘Created’ and ‘Accessed’ dates and times.  
This type of finding commonly indicates that a file has been created on some device 
other than the host and has been transferred from an external drive to the host.   
 
The result obtained when copying a file from MojoPac to a host was interesting.  The 





In Windows XP, the StreamMRU key stores up to 28 entries which relate to recent 
‘View’ preferences for the desktop and any windows which have been opened within 
it.  When a window is closed, the ‘View’ preference is written to a subkey.  That 
MojoPac created an artefact here suggests that the action of opening and closing the 
‘Documents and Settings’ folder within the vPC file system populated StreamMRU.  
Although launching the vPC opens a window on the host desktop, this key was not 
populated during Baseline experiment b), when the software was run but no other 
action took place.   
 
The Windows 7 Registry does not contain a StreamMRU category.  Data which was 
stored in this area under Windows XP, as well as previously available Shell and 







which is found in the user profile of interest at: \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows. 
When this experiment was conducted for all vPCs except MojoPac on a Windows 7 
host, however, no entries of potential evidential interest were found under these Shell 
subkeys. 
 
6.3.2 Write and save a text file on the vPC  (Experiment 5) 
  
Following this experiment, the UserAssist key in the Registry was found to hold 
evidence that a word processing program had been used from an external drive for all 
vPCs except MojoPac.   As noted in 6.2.4, above, the UserAssist key keeps a record of 
the applications which have been launched on a system, the number of times those 
applications have been launched, together with associated date and time data.  A 
possible reason why data was not retained in this key when using MojoPac is that the 
vPC has its own Registry, avoiding the need to use that on the host.    
 
For the vPCs PortableApps and LupoPenSuite, it was possible to discover the names 
of the documents created during this experiment and the associated file paths.  This 
information was found in the ComDlg32 subkey in the Registry.  Under normal 
conditions, the names of opened and saved files will be stored here as a list, the most 
recently used files in terms of date and time being shown under the key name 
MRUList.  In Windows 7, though, software developers can set a flag in their 
applications so that this information is not recorded.  As Ceedo Personal left no data in 
this key, it is possible that its developers programmed the software in this way. 
 6.3.3 Run a program executable on the vPC  (Experiment 6) 
 
The UserAssist key was again the chief source of information following this 
experiment for the reasons documented above.  While the IconCache.db would 
normally be expected to retain a record of executable files which have been run on the 
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host or from other media, it was noted that the database did not keep a record of 
executable files run from within a vPC environment.  A possible explanation is that 
the icons for these executables are not held in the root of the vPC container drive but 
instead are kept in program folders in the vPC’s file system.  They are potentially 
therefore referenced and rendered from within the vPC. 
6.3.4 Launch a browser on the vPC  (Experiment 7) 
 
A browser is usually launched by double clicking on the icon for the relevant program 
executable file.  This action would normally cause a record to be kept in the 
UserAssist key in the Registry. MojoPac has the browser Internet Explorer 
preinstalled.  Launching this from within the program did not populate the UserAssist 
key in Windows XP.  A possible explanation is that the information was collected 
within the Registry on the vPC, thus bypassing that on the host.   
 
Other test vPCs had versions of the Firefox browser installed.  In the case of Ceedo,  
launching the application and afterwards closing out of the vPC did cause an artefact 
to be left in the UserAssist key in Windows 7.  It was shown that a Firefox uninstaller 
program had run.  This result suggests that Ceedo is programmed to clean up after 
itself, at least where Firefox has been used.  A similar action appeared to have 
occurred after launching the Firefox Portable browser in Portable Apps. While running 
Firefox Portable within this vPC did populate the UserAssist key, further evidence to 
corroborate its use was found during analysis at: 
%username/AppData/Roaming 
 
The AppData/Roaming folder holds data which can move with the user profile from 
PC to PC where the machines in question are on the same network so that 
synchronisation of information such as web page favourites and bookmarks can occur.  
A deleted folder marked ‘Mozilla’ existed in this location on the host, together with 
associated subfolders.  No data was visible within the deleted folders, nevertheless, 
dates and times associated with the creation of the folders were retained.  These tallied 
with the dates and times retained in the UserAssist key for the launch of Firefox 
Portable.  Other records that the software had been run were created in the Prefetch 
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folder and a System log file, however, specific date and time information was not 
available in the log file.   
 
Similar Prefetch and System records were found during analysis after this experiment 
was conducted on LupoPenSuite and the launch of Firefox Portable likewise caused 
artefacts to be retained in the UserAssist key but for this vPC, no traces of its use were 
found in the AppData/Roaming folder.   
6.3.5 Conduct a search from a vPC-based browser (Experiment 8) 
 
Following this experiment, each host hard disk was imaged and a full index of the 
contents was made.  As well as investigating common areas for evidence of browser 
usage and searching, such as browser cache, history and cookies, keyword searches 
were made for the specific terms used during experimentation. For all the vPCs tested, 
none of the specific terms e.g.YellowAlligator  were found.  Process Monitor was used 
to identify activity during each experiment and it was observed that browser usage 
data was being written back to the vPC in play, rather than to the host.  When the vPCs 
were analysed individually using IEF v.6.3.2, the search terms which had been entered 
in at each browser were in fact found to be stored on the vPC concerned. 
6.3.6 Comparative results - Windows 7 64-bit     
 
For all compatible vPCs, the scenario-based experiments discussed above were again 
conducted on Windows 7 64-bit systems.  The areas of the operating system which 
yielded results of investigative interest on 32-bit systems were found to do the same on 
64-bit systems.  An additional finding of note was that running the Ceedo Personal 
vPC caused artefacts to be written to the MountPoints2 key within the named user’s 
NTUser.dat file.  Data found in the MountPoints2 key can be used to tie a particular 
user to a particular suspect device – the GUID (Globally Unique Identifier) of the 
suspect device would potentially be retained here.  However, on Windows 7 systems, a 
number of users can be logged in at the same time.  When one logged-in user inserts a 
USB device, the MountPoints2 key for all logged-in users will automatically be 
updated with that information.  This means that a forensic examiner needs to interpret 
any reading found here with caution.  During this research experimentation, the 
interpretation was straightforward since – barring one experiment - only one named 
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user (Jan) had been set up on the test host system.  The introduction of Ceedo Personal 
to the test host could therefore be attributed to the named user.  Further corroboration 
was found in the IconCache.db where a textual record showing the launch of Ceedo 
from an external drive was retained.  This discovery underpinned, once more, the 
usefulness of analysing the IconCache.db.  This author’s research on the database has 
shown that an IconCache.db record is kept for each individual user of a Windows 
computer.  During testing, actions such as running a program executable caused a 
record to be created in the IconCache of the user responsible.  In a further experiment, 
when a second user (Max) was set up on a test system, no update was made to the 
IconCache.db record for user Max when this user was logged in at the same time as 
the first user on the same machine. Whilst further research would be appropriate in 
this area, this finding was encouraging.  Multiple user log-in is enabled by default on 
Windows 7 through the operating system’s Fast User Switching mechanism.  
Although the mechanism exists in Windows XP, it is disabled by default thus on a 
multiple user system, one active user must log out before another can log in. 
 
Another finding of interest which was made during experimentation with Windows 7 
64-bit systems was that a record identifying documents copied to and from a Ceedo 
vPC was retained on the host.  The record occurred in a log file associated with the 
NTuser.dat file for the named user.  Further experimentation would be necessary in 
order to clarify why this artefact was created but some form of arbitrary data 
corruption is suggested in that a ‘Ceedo Repair’ appears to have been instigated from 
the vPC via the software’s ‘AutoDetect.exe’ program.  Whatever the rationale, the 
information written back to the host was very useful.  In a real-life investigation 
where, for instance, it was suspected that a sensitive document had been copied from a 
corporate host machine, the name of the document would be known and could be 
searched for; a search which might well locate this type of data.  At a minimum, an 
analyst would be made aware that a Ceedo vPC had been introduced to the host – 
something that may not have been known before – and that Notepad++ , a program not 
installed as standard on Windows 7 ,  had also been run.  Furthermore, the existence of 
a rogue text file such as ‘MyHakz.txt’ would be a cause for concern.  This unusual or 
unexpected file could now be searched for on the host.  Finally, that the host operating 
system stored this information in a log file affirms the importance, during a digital 
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forensic examination, of taking time to check the contents of log files since they can 
often prove useful in this way. 
 
• Summary Result 
This research has shown that: 
a) Copying and pasting files between a Windows host system and a vPC is likely 
to cause artefacts of potential evidential interest to be created on the host, 
though these may be subtle e.g. Updated MAC dates and times on a host-
resident file may not engender instant suspicion but could be important if an 
investigation involving potential data theft was already underway. 
b) Creating and saving a document on a vPC is likely to cause artefacts to be 
created on a host which can be located during a static analysis.  Depending on 
the vPC being used, details of the names of such saved documents and 
relevant file paths may be retained on the host, particularly in the Registry.  
An analysis of any Log files retained on the host can also be worthwhile. 
c) Running a program executable from a vPC is likely to cause artefacts to be 
created in the UserAssist key within a named user’s NTUser.dat file but not 
within the IconCache.db for that user if the executable concerned is not 
located in the root of the drive. 
d)   Running a browser from a vPC is likely to cause artefacts to be created in the 
UserAssist key.  Depending on the vPC, other records may also be retained in 
system files. 
e) Conducting a word search in a browser running from a vPC is unlikely to 
cause artefacts that identify the search terms used to be retained on the host 
system.   
f) Evidence that user-initiated activities have been conducted from a vPC can be 
found during analysis of a static host hard disk.  These activities can be 
attributed to a specific user name existing on the host. 
g)   Where it is possible to capture live RAM, further corroborative evidence of 
vPC user-initiated activity will be obtained. 
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6.4 Chapter summary 
 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that it is possible to extract and analyse artefacts of 
potential evidential interest from system files that have been created on Windows 
hosts by miniature computing environments running from USB devices.  
With that aim in mind, this chapter reviewed and discussed the findings made as a 
result of the experimentation conducted during this research project and detailed in 
Chapter 5.  The discussion centered around the artefacts of potential evidential interest 
which were created on test host computers as a result of introducing vPC software to 
them in a variety of ways.  The absence of artefacts which a digital forensic examiner 
would normally expect to be created under circumstances where an unauthorized USB 
device had been attached to a workstation and certain user-initiated activities had been 
carried out was also considered.  The analysis techniques employed included those 
which are currently standard practice in the industry where a static hard disk is the data 
source.  A new technique, developed by the author, which involved analyzing the 
IconCache database was also used.  Live RAM was captured during experimentation 
by means of taking a memory dump from the live test host before inducing a system 
halt.  The contents of these memory dumps were discussed in this chapter in the 
context of other findings where the additional information discovered was helpful.     
 
The outcomes from two ‘baseline’ tests were analysed.  Where a vPC was introduced 
to a host but the software was not run, it was found that the Windows host 
nevertheless carried out an enumeration process for the containing USB.  As a result, 
through examining Registry keys and other system files, it is possible for a computer 
analyst to discover that a suspect USB memory stick has been introduced to the host, 
when the incident occurred and under which user name, the make and model of the 
device involved, its serial number, its unique ID and the drive letter which was 
assigned to it.  The IconCache.db was also shown to have potential as a resource – an 
identifiable trace of the vPC MojoPac was left in this artefact, even though the 
software was not run.  This type of finding could alert a computer analyst to look for 
further traces of vPC software, something which may change the course and face of an 
investigation.     
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In a second baseline experiment, the test vPCs were launched. For every vPC under 
review, this action alone caused a large number of artefacts to be created on host 
systems both in allocated and unallocated space.  These could be discovered using 
existing analysis techniques for static hard drives.  Analysis of the IconCache.db was 
again shown to be worthwhile.  Artefacts of potential evidential interest were created 
in the IconCache.db following this experiment.  It was possible to compare readings 
from the database with those obtained from the MUICache key in the Registry, 
helping to identify which programs were run from the vPC under consideration. 
 
A number of scenario-based experiments were conducted next.  These were based on 
user-initiated activity, such as copying and pasting files between host machines and 
vPCs, writing and saving a file on a vPC and carrying out a search via a web browser 
from a vPC.  Results were obtained in almost every test case.  While evidence of file 
copying from a host to a vPC was limited to date changes on the host file, this was 
nevertheless a useful finding which could inform an existing investigation into 
potential data theft.  Where a document was created and saved on a vPC, it was found 
that in some cases, the name of the document together with the relevant file path was 
retained on the host – a significant finding which would very helpfully inform an 
enquiry.  When a browser was run from a vPC, this action could be verified in every 
test case save one, as the name of the browser software could be identified.  It was not 
possible, however, to discover any search terms which had been used within the test 
browsers.      
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CHAPTER 7. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Developments in desktop virtualisation technologies over the past decade have made it 
possible to run a separate, functioning computer environment from a USB memory 
stick connected to a host system.  Once introduced to the host, these miniature systems 
– which are termed vPCs, in this thesis - allow a user to carry out every-day activities 
such as playing games, making, moving and copying files and accessing the Internet.  
Where a user is keen to preserve personal privacy, the vPC offers the advantage of 
strong confidentiality.  From an information security perspective the technology can 
be seen as a new threat, expanding the risk of data loss or network corruption already 
posed by the use of USB memory sticks in general and modern ways of working such 
as BYOD.  An equal concern is that in the hands of a wrongdoer, a vPC could be used 
to evade detection when carrying out unauthorised or potentially criminal activities.  
As documented at the beginning of this study, some manufacturers of vPC software 
claim that running it will either leave ‘no trace’ of user activity on a host machine or 
that ‘no personal data’ will be retained. Statements such as these imply that secrecy as 
well as security is ensured, an idea which could be appealing to people with nefarious 
intentions. 
 
The potential dangers posed by the uncontrolled connection of USB devices have been 
discussed in previous studies.  These dangers are so widely acknowledged that a 
significant amount of research has centred around the effects of connecting USB 
devices to Windows-based computers and the analysis of any ensuing artefacts.  This 
is the background against which this research program has been developed, as 
discussed in Chapter 1.  The program builds on the existing body of knowledge in this 
area of digital forensic science and expands it by presenting and explaining a new 
artefact which aids investigations involving the unauthorized use of USB devices and 
USB-bound software.  Further, this thesis informs research into antiforensics by 
showing – as proposed in the hypothesis - that it is possible to uncover evidence that 
portable virtualisation software has been introduced to and used on a Windows host 
computer.  This is a novel and relatively unexplored field of enquiry. 
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The problem area identified in this research is broad and five main topics are presented 
and discussed in Chapter 2.  These are: Virtual Machines (VMs), Virtualisation 
technologies for USBs , Windows memory handling, Windows forensic artefacts and 
current Best Practice guides for forensic practitioners.  This breadth of enquiry is 
necessary in order to provide a proper context for the design and implementation of 
the experimentation which is to be conducted.  Thus, the VM is defined and its use as 
a computing environment is described.  The potential for the use of VM software to 
leave artefacts of possible evidential interest on a host machine is discussed, leading to 
the supposition that the same could be true of miniature VM software which is capable 
of running from a USB connectable memory stick.  The idea that other virtualisation 
technologies might do the same follows.  An overview of how the Windows operating 
system handles memory is given in order to give a basic understanding of how a 
running computer deals with data.  The types of artefacts that the every-day use of a 
USB connectable device will create on a host machine are also considered, the better 
to explain current digital forensic techniques. As is discussed, these can include the 
capture and analysis of both live and static data but in real-life situations, ‘best 
practice’ guidelines can impact on the choices made and the options may anyway be 
limited by circumstances at the scene of the enquiry. 
 
The software packages chosen for testing are also presented in Chapter 2.  These are 
desktop virtualisations which have been designed as standalone programs: all will run 
on compatible computers without being installed.  The test programs fall broadly into 
two categories: Virtual Machines and Portable Applications.  Virtual Machines allow 
for programs which are installed within the provided environment to interact with one 
another whereas in Portable Applications the various software packages made 
available are designed to run separately.  The objectives of the research are set out, 
these are: 
1) To explore the potential for portable computing environments to be used to 
commit unlawful acts in the context of existing concerns regarding the use of 
USB connectable devices in general. 
2) To examine selected miniature computing environments and analyse the 
effects of carrying out a range of common activities via these on an host 
computer. 
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3) To consider currently available methods of analyzing Windows computer 
systems for evidence of activity involving a user-connected USB device  
4) To create a chart of key areas to be examined and analysed when investigating 
the use of miniature computing environments and/or USB connectable devices. 
To this end, the aim of the research project has been to develop a methodology which 
both informs the forensic analysis of Windows computers where portable 
virtualisation software is thought to have played a part in the unlawful or unauthorized 
access of an host system and generally assists the investigation of cases in which the 
potential unlawful/unauthorized use of USB connectable devices exists.  During the 
project, as detailed in Chapter 3, a series of procedures have therefore been devised in 
order to meet these objectives.  Firstly, baseline experiments were conducted to 
identify the types of artefacts which would remain on test Windows XP and Windows 
7 operating systems following: 
a) the connection of a blank USB memory stick. 
b) the connection of a USB bearing a miniature computing environment (vPC). 
c) connecting a vPC and launching the software.  
 
Comparisons were made between the data sets collected and by this means it was 
possible to isolate a data set of interest (DSOI) to inform further work.  Secondly, a  
series of defined experiments were conducted.  The intention was to reproduce some 
of the basic activities which the computer user in possession of a vPC would, in the 
view of the author, likely wish to carry out.  These included copying and pasting text 
and picture files to and from a host, writing and saving a text file on a vPC, launching 
a web browser and searching for specific terms on the Internet.  Each of these 
activities were carried out for each test vPC application in the context of each 
compatible test operating system.  For every experiment, a RAM dump was taken 
before system close. This was inspected for findings of potential interest, as was the 
test host hard drive during subsequent static analysis.  The outputs were recorded and 
analysed and the results were compared and discussed so that the hypothesis of this 
thesis could be fully evaluated.        
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7.1 Proof of Hypothesis 
 
It is proposed that the hypothesis of this project, namely that it is possible to extract 
and analyse artefacts of potential evidential interest from system files that have been 
created on Windows hosts by miniature computing environments running from USB 
devices (vPCs), has been proved.  It was found that, for the systems tested, the 
introduction and use of USB-bound vPCs on Windows hosts can create numerous 
artefacts of interest to digital forensic examiners and that the majority of these can be 
located on a static hard disk using existing methods.  At a minimum, analysis of these 
artefacts will enable an enquirer to establish the name of the vPC environment 
invoked, the user name under which it was introduced to the host and which programs 
were run from within it, together with relevant dates and times, the drive letter 
allocated to the containing USB key plus details enabling identification of that key, 
such as the make and serial number.  The Pagefile may be a further resource.  Where 
the collection of live memory is possible, this can reveal the names of files copied 
between a vPC and a host, together with relevant file paths.  The names of files created 
and saved within the miniature environment may also be found in RAM.  Importantly, 
for some vPCs, these can be retained on the host, too, as can folders that are created 
and afterwards deleted when a portable browser is used.  These are the types of 
findings which helpfully inform a digital forensic investigation. 
7.2 Contribution to knowledge 
 
Furthermore, it is also proposed that this research program has added to the existing 
knowledge base in the field of digital forensics both by exploring how vPCs interact 
with hosts and by discovering and investigating the evidential potential of the 
IconCache database.  It is shown, in Chapter 4 of this thesis, that as well as storing 
system and program-related icons, the IconCache.db also retains a textual record of the 
activities which it facilitates.  Of particular interest are the artefacts retained in the 
database as a result of user-initiated activity.  These include the names of executable 
files that were run or installed from external media and the associated file path.  This 
finding greatly assisted the hunt for evidence related to vPC activity on a host, as 
documented in Chapters 5 and 6.  Data gathered from the IconCache.db could be 
correlated with that gathered from traditional areas of investigation within the 
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Windows operating system, such as the Registry and Prefetch folder, which helped to 
support and clarify the findings made.  Besides being a useful resource where the 
unauthorized use of vPCs in particular or USB connectable devices in general is 
suspected, the IconCache.db can aid other kinds of digital forensic investigation.   For 
example, it can be used to show that certain programs existed and were used on a 
machine, even if those programs have been uninstalled.  Likewise, in cases where an 
external encryption program, malware or antiforensics tool has been used, it may 
provide the only indication since malware is often written to bypass the Registry and 
clean up any of its other traces on a host and antiforensics tools normally target certain 
Registry keys, clearing any information that may be held there.  It is advised that 
analysis of the IconCache.db should be approached with due caution as it may contain 
the icons of executables which were merely stored on some attached media, not 
actually run from it.  However, this same proclivity might help to reveal the potential 
source of a rogue program found elsewhere on a computer network.  Where the 
analysis of a single workstation is involved, comparing readings from the IconCache 
with those obtained from the MUICache key in the Registry can help to establish 
which programs have been used on that system.   
 
For the above reasons, it is suggested that an analysis of the IconCache database 
should routinely be incorporated into digital forensic investigations.  As well as 
fleshing out information gathered during an analysis of the Registry and Prefetch 
folder, readings from the IconCache.db can help to identify new lines of enquiry.  This 
has been proved to be the case in two complex investigations recently carried out by 
the author, who is a practicing digital forensic examiner.  In one instance, involving 
rival bids for a multi-million pound building contract, an inspection of the 
IconCache.db revealed the potential use of encryption software by an employee who 
was suspected of divulging the details of secret negotiations between the parties.  No 
markers from the encryption software had been found in the Registry or elsewhere on 
the employee’s workstation, therefore the IconCache.db was a lone resource.  In a 
second matter, where it was feared that the servers of a secure industrial site had been 
hacked, an unauthorised user name was discovered and the IconCache.db for it was 
examined.  The names of the malware packages used by the intruder were retained in 
the IconCache, a finding which greatly increased the speed at which damage-limiting 




The author’s research on the IconCache.db, as detailed in this thesis, has been 
considered important enough to merit publication in Digital Investigation, a journal 
widely respected by the digital forensic community worldwide, in 2013.  The UK’s 
digital forensic community, as represented by F3 - The First Forensic Forum8 - also 
showed its interest in this research by inviting the author to present her findings at its 
annual conference the same year.  
 
Information stored in the IconCache.db is especially useful where it is suspected that 
some unauthorised media has been connected to a system via USB.  Devices such as 
vPCs, which can be used for data movements, Internet browsing and antiforensics will 
leave their mark in the artefact.  The focus of a computer investigation may shift as a 
result, prompting a deeper and wider search for related artefacts in both allocated and 
unallocated space.  As shown in this thesis, a great deal of helpful information can be 
discovered during a targeted search for vPC activity on Windows systems.  While 
existing analysis techniques may alert an examiner to some of these activities, 
additional techniques, as identified in this research, need to be employed in order to 
obtain a fuller picture of events.  
 
A digest of the author’s research in this area was presented at the 11th Annual 
International Conference on Information Technology and Computer Science of the 
Athens Institute for Education and Research (ATINER) in May 2015.  It was 
published in ATINER’s Conference Paper Series in October 2015 and has been chosen 
for further publication in a forthcoming issue of the Athens Journal of Sciences. 
 
This research program has been designed with the needs of information security 
professionals, law enforcement agencies and digital forensic examiners in mind.  In an 
increasingly wired world, the threat landscape broadens daily.  System hacks and 
malware attacks which result in data loss or theft are commonplace, frequently 
followed by financial and legal recriminations.  In this environment, the information 
security professional must constantly ask: ‘Is the data safe?’ and ‘How can I best 
                                                
8 https://www.f3.org.uk 
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secure data?’  In investigating the vPC, this research helps to raise awareness of a 
trending technology which could easily infiltrate the corporate environment.  If data 
escapes or is stolen, the questions will become: ‘What happened? When did it happen?’ 
and ‘Who’s responsible?’  These are questions which law enforcement officers will 
also ask, together with: ‘How can we prove what happened?’ and ‘How can we prove 
who’s responsible?’.  The digital forensic examiner will be needed to produce the 
answers, insofar as answers are possible.  In the vast majority of cases, computer 
evidence is circumstantial: it is very difficult to prove whose hands were on the 
keyboard at any given time.  The diligent digital forensic analyst will therefore go to 
great lengths to build a body of evidence which keeps leading back to a given suspect 
or source.  Any artefact created by the computer operating system which can help the 
analyst to find out what was happening, when and - ideally - who was responsible for 
which actions, is a welcome addition to the armory.  As well as uncovering and 
explaining evidence which can show that portable virtualisation software has been 
introduced to and used on a host computer, this research presents the IconCache.db, a 
previously unexplored artefact, which fundamentally aids investigations involving the 
unauthorized use of USB devices and USB-bound software.  The ability to trace the 
installation or use of a foreign program such as a vPC to a USB connectable or other 
media is important during a digital forensic enquiry.  The information could help to 
narrow down the search for a culprit.  It could also help to suggest where other 
evidence might exist or reveal the potential source of an unwanted or prohibited 
program found elsewhere on a computer system. 
7.3 Further Work 
 
In respect of vPCs and user-activity related activity, further research is needed on 
static systems in order to establish whether artefacts of potential evidential interest 
might be recovered from other areas of the Windows operating system, such as 
volume shadow copies and hibernation files.  While results from pagefile analysis 
during this round of research did not reveal much of note, further testing might also 
produce something worthwhile.  In respect of live data collection, further in-depth 
research is needed on the contents of RAM.  A number of new tools have been 
developed to aid this type of analysis in the past 18 months and outputs from these 
could usefully be compared and contrasted with those obtained from older tools.  It 
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would also be useful to explore how various vPCs interact with computer systems 
running Windows 8 and the upcoming Windows 10 operating system.   
 
In respect of the IconCache.db, the author’s research has already been extended by 
other researchers whose work has helped to clarify its structure and functionality.  
While these researchers have developed a tool that parses file paths from the 
IconCache.db under Windows 7 and 8, an opportunity to develop software capable of 
rendering icons stored in the database together with these file paths remains.  Further 
research is also necessary into the type of information which is stored in the 
IconCache.db as a result of differences between Windows 8 and Windows 10 and 
previous operating systems – for example, from the Start Screen ‘Live Tiles’ used by 
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Abstract - This paper investigates the evidential potential of the IconCache 
database file when tracking activity from USB connectable devices on Windows 
systems.  It focuses on the artifacts which are created and retained on a Windows 
host when executable files are either present on or run from a USB connectable 
device.  Artifacts left in the IconCache database as a result of running executables 
from a DVD drive or the host itself, are also examined. 
 
It is shown that the IconCache.db stores numerous artifacts of investigative 
interest.  These are created on system boot and added to, both when using host-
based executables and when installing or using executables from other media.  
Executables present on USB devices, whether invoked or not, will create artifacts 
in the IconCache.db. file.  Findings should therefore be interpreted carefully and 
corroborated against other evidence. 
     
 
1. Introduction  
 
The uncontrolled connection of USB devices to computer systems is widely acknowledged as a 
serious security threat (DiRenzo, 2012; Garrity and Weir, 2010; Pham et. al., 2010; Tetmeyer, 
2010).  USB connectable memory sticks - also known as thumb drives or keys -  present a 
particular risk, both to sensitive data and the systems used to serve and store them.  Small, 
cheap and easily available, they open up opportunities for both the theft and casual loss of 
valuable information. Viruses and other malicious software can also be introduced to stand-
alone or networked computer systems via USB, whether deliberately or inadvertently (DiRenzo, 
2012; Sharma, 2011).  From the perspective of digital forensic analysis, there is a danger that 
anti-forensic programs can be run direct from a USB key, helping wrongdoers to cover up or 
completely wipe out any traces of their activities (Thomas and Morris, 2008).     
 
For all these reasons, forensic analysis of artifacts left behind by the use of USB connectable 
devices has become an integral part of computer investigations in corporate and criminal cases. 
Prior research in this area has concentrated on the Windows Registry, including Carvey (2005 & 
2009), Carvey and Altheide (2005), Mee, and Jones (2005) and Mee, et al (2006). Carvey 
(2005) has shown that the Windows system may also store traces of USB connection activity in 
Link files, Shortcuts and the PreFetch folder. Such artifacts can help a forensic analyst trace 
file-related activity, such as opening a document on or copying a picture to a particular device 
(Roy and Jain, 2012). Other artifacts are created in the Windows Registry when programs are 
executed. The UserAssist key, for example, stores information about recently used and 
frequently used programs and the number of times these programs have been launched (Stevens, 
D. 2010).  If a program is run from a USB connectable device, therefore, it is possible that a 
record of that action will be kept by the system in this Registry key.  Using a new application on 
a Windows system will also populate the MUICache Registry key (NirSoft, 2011), so this key 
may also contain useful information. 
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This paper seeks to extend the field of enquiry beyond the Registry by examining the IconCache 
database file, a hidden file which is created and maintained on computers running Windows 
operating systems, in terms of its evidential potential.  Caching mechanisms, such as the 
IconCache database, have been discussed by systems specialists in terms of their role in 
Windows memory management (Russinovich and Solomon, 2005).  The investigative potential 
of such mechanisms has yet to be explored. The aim of this work is to help digital forensic 
analysts to identify and/or corroborate computer user activity, in particular the use of portable 
USB devices or DVDs.  
 
For the purposes of this research, samples of the three Microsoft Windows operating systems 
are examined:  Windows XP, Windows Vista and Windows 7.   These have been chosen 
because, at the time of writing, the Windows XP and Windows 7 operating systems account for 
approximately 80% of all operating systems in use, Windows Vista being the next most popular 
(Statcounter, 2012; w3schools, 2012; Marketshare, 2012).  It is likely, therefore, that computer 
examiners will commonly be analyzing these operating systems.  It is assumed that home 
directories are present on the systems under analysis and have not been moved elsewhere e.g. to 
a server. 
 
The paper chiefly examines the artifacts produced and retained in the IconCache database file 
when a USB device containing an executable file is connected to a Windows host.  The effects 
of introducing and running executables from a DVD drive and from the host itself are also 
considered.  An overview of how the IconCache database comes into being and how it 
accumulates artifacts of potential forensic interest is given, however a full explanation of the 
workings of the icon caching mechanism in Windows goes beyond this paper’s scope.  While 
some interrelated files are referred to, the primary intention is to look at what is stored in the 
database as a result of user activity and how these artifacts could help inform digital forensic 
analysis.    
 
 
2.  Illustrative Case Example 
 
A recent investigation performed by the author demonstrates the forensic value of information 
in the IconCache database. Two rival companies were pitching for a multi-million pound 
contract to buy and convert a large public building.  The process, which was being carried out 
via closed bids, was overseen by an independent, third company, on behalf of a local council.  
Competition between the two bidders was intense.  As it increased, it was found that an 
employee of one of the rival companies was in a relationship with an employee of the 
independent overseer.  An urgent investigation was ordered to discover whether any impropriety 
had taken place. Although documents pertaining to the bidding war were highly sensitive, 
encryption was not being used by any of the parties.  A review of the computer used by one of 
the employees under suspicion showed that at least three different USB memory sticks had been 
connected to the machine during the time period of interest, however, no artifacts to suggest the 
use of any potentially problematic external program were found in the Windows Registry or 
elsewhere.  By comparison, an examination of the IconCache.db showed that an encryption 
program had been present on one USB drive introduced to the system.  This finding sparked a 
further enquiry involving a search for encrypted files on a number of other computers. At the 
end of the day, the use of encrypted files to pass sensitive information could not be ruled out.  
The bidding war was halted and restarted under stricter controls. 
 
 
3.  Synopsis of Findings 
 
On Windows systems, programs, files and folders are represented by icons - small symbolic 
pictures which provide a visual clue to what may be accessed by clicking on them.  However, 
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the desktop presented to the computer user would be impossibly cluttered if the system 
displayed every icon that it could. Having to retrieve all possible icon images from disk and 
render them, time and again, would also consume system resources unnecessarily. As a result, 
Windows systems save icons already retrieved, such as from programs which run automatically 
at startup, in a cache in memory (Holdeness, J.,1999).  
 
Since its introduction in Windows XP, the IconCache.db file has provided a mechanism for 
storing the icons associated with processes and programs that either run in the background or 
are otherwise initiated on a Windows-based system. This paper demonstrates that IconCache.db 
files can contain artifacts of a wide range of user-instigated activities which may be relevant to a 
digital investigation. These include activities carried out on the host system via a removable 
USB device which could otherwise be hard to trace or may not be traceable at all.	 
 
The IconCache.db is a hidden file stored in different locations, depending on the version of the 
operating system (OS).  
 
• Windows XP: C:\Documents and Settings\Username\Local Settings\Application 
Data\IconCache.db 
• Windows Vista or Windows 7: C:\Users\Username\AppData\Local\IconCache.db 
 
Because a separate IconCache database is maintained for each named user of a computer, 
artifacts in this file can be attributed to a specific user account. 
 
If the IconCache.db file does not already exist on a Windows system, it is automatically created 
at system startup and populated with a number of default system icons. The cache of icons 
exists in memory but will also be written to disk following a Windows shutdown or restart. In 
this way, the file persists from one session to another (Holdeness, J.,1999).    The IconCache.db 
grows as information is added to it by the processes and activities which occur on the machine. 
The changes which take place in the IconCache.db include both the addition of new visible 
icons and the addition of file paths to the programs or processes associated with those icons in 
the text portions of the data base.   
 
Of particular interest is the information which appears in the IconCache.db when a removable 
USB device or CD/DVD is connected to a host system and its contents are viewed.  If the 
removable media contains one or more executables at the root of the drive, then any associated 
icons are added to the database.  The file path, including the drive letter associated with the 




It should be noted that this action occurs whether any such executable is run or not, which 
means that readings obtained from the IconCache.db should be interpreted with care, ideally 
being corroborated against other findings.  Nevertheless, the database can be an useful aid to the 
digital analyst, especially where attempts have been made to conceal suspect activities, such as 
the use of an external encryption program or the introduction of malware via some USB device 
or optical media. Where these types of programs have been used on a computer but never 
installed, the IconCache.db may retain the only record of that activity.  
 
The IconCache.db can also help digital examiners in cases where a potentially suspect program 
e.g. Limewire has been installed on a system via removable media and later uninstalled.  While 
few traces of that activity may remain on the host, a record, complete with textual details of 
both the origin of the installation and the path to its location on the host, will be kept by the 
database. In an experiment carried out during this research, the Limewire installation package 
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was downloaded to the root of a USB stick and executed on the subject system, resulting in the 
following artifacts: 
   
1. Placing the stick into a Windows host and viewing its contents caused two Limewire 
icons to appear in the IconCache.db.  The textual portion of the file showed that the 
USB stick had been allocated the drive letter F: and that the Limewire executable was 




2. When the program was installed and run on the host, that path remained in the 
IconCache database and further information was added.  This showed the temporary 





The path to the location of the installed program on the C: drive of the computer 
followed: 
 
\temp\is-trm8s.tmp\limewire_setup.tmp%c:\program files\lime pro\limepro.exe 
 
3. When the program was run, more text was appended to the above information in the 
IconCache.db:  
%c:\program files\lime pro\limepro.exe 
 
4. When the program was uninstalled, further text was appended: 
 
&c:\program files\lime pro\unins000.exe 
 
 
While this research has not extended beyond this kind of initial result and the full meaning of 
the data obtained requires further analysis e.g. what, if anything, is indicated by the readings 
%c:\ and &c:\  in the above examples, the findings could still usefully inform a computer 
analysis.  On that basis, experiments were carried out to ascertain what happens in the 
IconCache.db as a result of a number of common activities, including: 
 
•  opening host files and folders  
•  placing a link to a host-based program on the desktop 
•  running a pre-installed program e.g. Notepad on the host 
•  loading a DVD containing an executable file 
•  inserting a USB drive containing one or more executables 
•  running an executable from a USB drive 
•  opening a file from a USB drive 
•  writing a file out to a USB drive 
•  creating a new user account on a system 
 
These effects have been investigated systematically by following defined sequence of actions 





3.1 File signature 
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In some cases, it may be necessary to salvage deleted IconCache.db files by carving for the file 
signature. The file signature for the IconCache.db appears to be consistent across Windows XP, 
Windows Vista and Windows 7 at offset 4 for four bytes, where the hexadecimal values: 57 69 
6E 34, read as text: Win4, are recorded (Table 1).  However, variances in the IconCache.db are 
found to occur at offset 8 and at offset 12 .  Examples are given in Table 2. 
 





Signature offset Hex Text 
Offset 4 for 4 bytes 57 69 6E 34 Win4 
 
 






4.  Research Method 
 
A formal test environment was established to ensure that the same experiment could be repeated 
consistently using the different versions of the Microsoft Windows operating system. The 
physical hardware used was a single PC workstation with an Intel Celeron processor (E3400 @ 
2.60 Ghz), 4GB of RAM and a standard VGA card. The computer was not connected to any 
network.   
 




For 1 byte 
Offset 8 
For 2 bytes 
Offset 12 
For 1 byte 
 
 







50 P 05 05  .. 54 T 
Windows Vista 
(32 bit) 
40 @ 06 05  .. 71 q 
Windows 7 
Home Premium 
(32 & 64 bit) 
 




40 @ 06 05  .. B1 ± 
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Firstly, the test OS was installed a single user account was set up on the system.  
Experimentation, data collection and analysis followed.  To eliminate potential data 
contamination or inconsistency during operating system installation and use, the hard disks were 
wiped before first use and between all experimental phases.   
 
The primary operating systems tested were Windows XP Home (SP2), Windows Vista Home 
Basic (32 Bit), and Windows 7 Home Premium (32 bit). Preliminary testing was also carried out 
on Windows 7 Home Premium (64 bit). 
In all cases, Windows was set up to run using UK English and with the time set to GMT 
London.  To ensure consistency, a single user name and computer name was used throughout.   
 
The forensic tools used to conduct this research are summarized in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Forensic tools used during experimentation 
 
Hardware / Software Purpose 
Logitech Talon  1: Hard disk secure data deletion 
(WipeClean method) 
2: Write-blocked hard disk capture 
Wiebetech USB Writeblocker Write-blocked attachment of USB 
devices to a forensic workstation 
host. 
FTK Imager Lite by Access Data Imaging test USB devices. 
Forensic Tool Kit (FTK) v. 3.1 & 3.2 by 
Access Data. 
Analysis of data. 
dec Windows Thumbnail Database Viewer v. 
1.8 by Dec Software1 








5. Experimentation  	
Based on the common or expected functionality found across all the Windows operating 
systems, three experiment stages were derived. These were: the clean install of an operating 
system as a starting point to baseline the experiments, initial interaction with the operating 
system and finally the extended or repeated user activity. In accordance with these stages and 
the objectives of this research, the experiments summarized in Table 4 were formulated. 
 
 	  																																																								
















Establish file provenance. Ascertain: 
1. When the IconCache.db file is 
created. 
2. Its contents immediately following 
creation. 
3. Its contents following a system 
restart. 
4. What happens if the IconCache.db 
file is deleted. 
5. What happens when a second user is 
set up on the host. 
 
 A1 Further research on 
IconCache.db to 






1. Assessment of IconCache.db default 
system icons immediately following 
creation. 
2. Review of default system icons in 
Shell32.dll 
 








To investigate the effects 
of common user activity 













 B1 To investigate the effects 
of basic user activity on 






3. IconCache.db contents after opening 
files & folders on the host system. 
4. Its contents after placing a link on 
the desktop from a host-based program. 
5. Its contents after running a host-
based executable. 
 
 B2 To investigate the effects 
of user initiated DVD 
activity. 
Ascertain: 
1. IconCache.db contents after loading 
a DVD containing an executable file 
into the host DVD tray. 
2. Its contents after installing a 
program on the host from a DVD. 
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 B3 To investigate the effects 
of connecting a USB 





1. IconCache.db contents following the 
connection of a clean USB thumb 
drive on the host.  
2. Its contents after connecting a USB 
drive containing files and folders 
only. 
3. Its contents after opening a file from 
a connected USB. 
4. Its contents after connecting a USB 
drive containing one or more 
executables. 
5. Its contents after an executable file 
is run from a thumb drive. 
  
B4 
Further research on 
IconCache.db to 
corroborate findings 
1. Creating a new user account 
2. File size changes for experiments in 
Set  
3. Date and time changes for 




Results from the experiments listed in Table 4 are summarized in the following sections. In the 
interests of brevity, specific examples of findings recorded in this section relate to Windows XP 
only since the same basic behaviour patterns were observed during the experiments on 
Windows Visa and Windows 7 32-bit systems. 
 
 
6.1  IconCache.db baseline behaviour 
 
When performing a forensic examination, it is important to know the baseline state of 
IconCache.db files to distinguish it from artifacts of user activities. Conducting the first 
experiment from Table 4 (Baseline IconCache.db Research) for the Windows operating systems 
chosen for research purposes resulted in the following findings: 
 
• The IconCache.db is not created during a clean install of the operating system. 
• The IconCache.db is created on system reboot following a clean OS install. 
• Where no user action apart from a system restart has taken place, an IconCache.db 
which contains a number of default system icon images is created as shown in Figure 1. 
• The numbers of default system icons present in the IconCache.db at creation may vary 
depending upon the operating system in use and the configuration settings chosen during 
installation. The numbers of icons recorded in the IconCache.db as a result of a clean 
























Windows Operating System Version Numbers of default system icons in 
IconCach.db on first creation of the 
file 
Windows XP Home Edition SP. 2 (32bit) 172 
Windows Vista Home Basic (32 bit) 426 
 
Windows 7 Home Premium (32 bit) 
 
158 





Further examination of the IconCache.db file using forensic software revealed a listing of 
programs and processes associated with the default system icons as shown in Fig. 2 . 
Specifically, Fig. 2 shows a sample start of the IconCache.db file, where references to 
shell32.dll is first noticeable, closely followed by the loading of Internet Explorer from the 
program files folder on the host hard drive, allocated letter C:, as is commonly the case. A 
record of other automatic processes which run on system restart comes next, with those that 




Figure 2.  Sample start of file, first generation of IconCache.db  
 
 
Forensic examination of the end of the IconCache.db file reveals that certain executables were 
loaded, including the solitaire game which forms part of the Windows install package (Fig. 3).  
The record: d:\setup.exe , is also visible.  This refers to the Windows XP executable, which has 
been run from the DVD drive, here allocated drive letter D: by the system. 
 




A second system restart, immediately following the first, added data to the IconCache.db file 
as shown in Fig. 4.  For instance, the fact that the logon screen had run was recorded by the 
“logon.scr” entry. 
 
   Figure 4.  Sample end of file, simple system restart following first generation of 
IconCache.db 
	
Two conclusions were drawn from the findings in Fig. 4.  First, since this information did not 
exist in the IconCache.db at inception, it must have been added to the file during use of the 
system.  Second, since the information was not visible in the database whilst the computer was 
running, it must have been added to the database on system shut down. 
6.2  Default System Icons in IconCache.db 
 
Some understanding of the origin of default system icons found in a baseline IconCache.db file 
can be helpful when explaining forensic findings. Tests carried out during this research 

















contains a number of default icons at initiation, each of which exist in a number of versions 
which have differing dimensions, numbers of colours and file sizes, as illustrated in Figures 5 
and 6, below: 
 
 












According to Microsoft (Hornick, 1995), Windows is aware of four different icon sizes – 
System Small, System Large, Shell Small and Shell Large.  A single icon (.ICO)  file or an 
.EXE or .DLL file can contain multiple images, each with a different size and/or colour depth.  
 
6.3 IconCache Artifacts of Program Usage 
 
From a forensic perspective, artifacts of user activities on a computer system can be useful for 
reconstructing events relating to an offense. Conducting the second set of experiments described 
in Table 4 resulted in findings summarized in the following sections, starting with the effects of 
basic user activity. The listing of programs and processes in the IconCache.db was shown to 
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grow as they were newly used, as did the number of associated icons retained.  This finding was 
corroborated by further tests to establish file size changes prompted by experimentation.  An 




Table 6: Increase in file size and icons retained in IconCache.db resulting from user action 
 
Action Number of 




File size (Bytes) 
Pre-Action 
IconCache.db 
181 n/a 2,149,330 
Create link to 
‘WordPad.exe’ on 
Desktop 
188 7 2,149,870 
Create ‘WordPad’ .txt 
file,  
save on Desktop 




6.4 IconCache Artifacts of DVD Usage 
 
Artifacts of user initiated DVD activity, including the installation and running of applications, 
can be very helpful in a digital investigation.  
 
a) Loading a DVD containing an executable file 
 
When a disk containing an application which had an ‘autorun’ icon was placed into the host’s 
DVD drive, that icon was stored in the IconCache.db .  Fig 7 illustrates how, when a DVD 
containing the forensic software application ‘XWays’ was loaded, two ‘autorun’ icons (the 
same graphic presented in different resolutions) were stored in the IconCache.db.  The textual 
reading from the database shows the presence of both of these icons (Fig. 8).  It also shows 
that the path to the application, including the drive letter associated with the DVD drive was 
retained. 
 












b) Installing an executable from a DVD 
 
When an application was installed on the host from an executable file on DVD, the icons for 
the application were stored in the IconCache.db.  The path to the executable, both on the DVD 
and in the ‘program files’ folder on the host’s C: drive, were also recorded in the file as shown 
in Fig. 9. 
 
Fig. 9:  Path to executable run from DVD in IconCache.db file 
 
 
c) Running an installed executable  
 
When the newly installed executable was then run on the host, a record this action was 
retained n the IconCache.db as shown in Fig. 10. 
 














6.5 IconCache Artifacts of USB Device Usage  
 
Artifacts of user initiated USB activity, including opening files and running executables, can be 
very helpful in a digital investigation.  
 
a) Opening a text file 
 
When a simple text file was opened from a memory stick, the IconCache.db recorded the 
running of both notepad.exe and wordpad.exe from the C: drive but did not retain the drive 
letter for the stick (Fig. 11).  Icons for both programs were also stored in the database. 
 
Figure 11: Sample end of file after text document run from USB memory stick 
 
 
b) Viewing a USB containing executable files 
 
When a USB memory stick containing an executable in the root of the drive was connected 
and viewed on the host, icons associated with that executable were stored in the IconCache.db 
despite the fact that it had not been run. As illustrated in Fig. 12, in a test in which a USB with 
the integral encryption program, Flashlokv232.exe, was connected to the host, its icon was 
stored in the IconCache.db file (first icon, second row down).  The path to the associated 
executable files,together with the drive letter allocated to the USB stick, was also retained 
(Fig. 13).  
 
 























c) Running an executable file from USB 
 
When an executable was run from a USB drive, icons associated with it were stored in the 
IconCache.db.  In a test in which the forensic software FTK imager lite was run from a USB, 
two icons associated with it were shown in the IconCache.db.  The textual reading from the 
database showed that these were both recorded, along with the path to the executable (Fig. 
14). 
 
Figure 14: Icons of Executable run from USB connectable shown in IconCache.db 
 
d) Installing an executable from a USB 
 
When an executable was installed on a host from a USB drive, the icons associated with it 
were stored in the IconCache.db.  In a test involving the once popular peer-to-peer application, 
Limewire, two instances of its executable icon and two associated setup icons were retained in 
the IconCache.db, (Fig. 15).  The path to the executable on the USB was also revealed in the 













Figure 15: Icons from Limewire application, installed from USB connectable & run on host 










e) Uninstalling an executable placed on the host via USB  
 
When the Limewire executable was subsequently deleted from the Windows host, using the 
program’s own uninstaller, five icons related to it nevertheless remained in the IconCache.db, 
as shown in Fig. 17 (icons 3 & 4 second row and 1, 2 & 3, third row). 
 













6.6 Creating a New User Account  
 
When a new user account was set up on the host machine, an IconCache.db for that user was 
created in their profile, separate to and different from the IconCache.db for the original user, as 
shown in the ASCII output in Fig. 18.  The creation of the new user did not update the original 
user’s IconCache.db with any information about new user activity.  The original user’s 
IconCache.db was merely updated with a call to “System 32\mshta.exe,” which is a system file 
associated with the Microsoft HTML application host. 
 




6.7 IconCache.db File System Information 
 
Changes in date and time stamps for the IconCache.db were recorded during experimentation. 
It was observed that, for the 32-bit operating systems tested during this research: 
 
• When the IconCache.db was deleted, it was recreated on system reboot with its original 
created date/time and with a modified time which reflected the time of its deletion.  This 
finding supports the supposition that the database is written to disk at system shut down 
or reboot.  
• The IconCache.db file modification times were updated following actions which caused 
new information to be retained in it – the example chosen here was creating a text file and 
shell32.dll/c:\program	files\internet	explorer\iexplore.exeGc:\documents	and	settings\max\start	menu\programs\internet	explorer.lnk*c:\program	files\outlook	express\msimn.exeEc:\documents	and	settings\max\start	menu\programs\outlook	express.lnk/c:\program	files\internet		
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saving it to a USB memory stick.  
 
Table 7. Date and Time changes to IconCache.db in Windows XP 
 
Experiment Action Created Modified 
A. 1.1 First instance 
IconCache.db 
28/02/12 21.07 28/02/12 21.07 
A. 1.1 Delete 
IconCache.db@ 
21.33, restart 
28/02/12 21.07 28/02/12 21.33 
B2. 1.3 Create .txt file, 
save to USB, 
restart 
28/02/12 21.07 28/02/12 21.12 
 
 
Preliminary testing on a Windows 7 Home Basic 64-bit installation produced a variation in 
results, as follows: 
 
• When the IconCache.db was deleted, it was not immediately recreated on system 
re-boot.  In fact, no IconCache.db was apparent. 
• A new IconCache.db was created following a second system reboot. It was smaller 
in size than the original (804 kb as opposed to 1.08 mb following a fresh install). 
 
In common with the 32-bit systems examined, however, modification times for the 





8. Conclusion  
 
The IconCache.db can contain artifacts of user activities that could be useful in digital 
investigation. Artifacts retained in the IconCache.db can be especially useful in identifying 
executable files that were run or installed from external media such as DVDs and USB 
connectable devices. 
 
The ability to trace the installation or use of a foreign program to a USB connectable or other 
media can help to narrow down the search for a culprit, can reveal usage of external encryption 
programs, and can suggest where other evidence might exist.  Care should be taken, however, in 
interpreting findings since the IconCache.db may contain the icons of executables which were 
merely stored on a USB connectable, not actually run from it.  Opening and viewing the 
contents of a USB device which contains a program executable file will cause any related icon 
to be stored in the database.     
 
The IconCache.db contains a wealth of information including file paths to the programs and 
processes which have been invoked on fixed and attached drives.  Since an IconCache.db exists 
for each named user of a computer, the file paths also reveal which activities occurred under 
which user name.      
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Further research is needed in order to gain a better understanding of the IconCache.db in terms 
of its structure and functionality.  This would greatly aid the interpretation of information to be 
found in the file.  An opportunity also exists to develop software capable of rendering icons 
stored in the data base together with properly parsed date and time data.   
 
Further research is needed in order to clarify how the IconCache.db behaves in 64 bit versions 
of the Windows operating system.  Initial experimentation with Windows 7 Home Premium 64 
bit has indicated that, once created, the file stores artifacts associated with user-based computer 
activity in a similar way to the 32-bit operating systems which were tested during this research.  
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Form for identifying vPCs and Windows OSs and monitoring 




vPC	name	 vPC	Designation:	 Windows	OS:	 OS	
Designation:	
MojoPac	 A	 XP	Pro	(32)	 A	
Ceedo	 B	 XP	Pro	(64)	 B	
Lupo	PenSuite	 C	 7	Pro	(32)	 C	
























Experiment:	 Details	 Artefacts?	 Record	
sheet	
1	 Copy a text file ; vPC to host 	 	 	
2 Copy a text file ; host to vPC 	 	 	
3 Copy a picture file ; vPC to 
host 
	 	 	
4 Copy a picture file; host to vPC 	 	 	
5 Write and save a text file on 
the vPC 
	 	 	
6 Run a program executable on  
the vPC 
	 	 	
7 Launch a browser on the vPC 	 	 	





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































‘Quick reference’ chart for vPC artefacts 




















IconCache.db sample file size changes during experiments 
  
	 49
NB: ‘Baseline IconCache.db’ indicates properties of .db file before the listed 
experiment was run, not a virgin IconCache.db file. 
 
Experiment A  
 




File size (Bytes) 
 Clean OS install No file  No file 
A1.3 Restart host 172  2,148,748 
 
A1.4 
Delete IconCache.db,  
restart 





Exp Action Number of 




File size (Bytes) 
 Baseline IconCache.db 181  2,149,330 
1.1 Create link to 
‘WordPad.exe’ on 
Desktop 
188 7 2,149,870 
1.3 Create ‘WordPad’ .txt 
file,  
save on Desktop 






Exp Action Number of 




File size (Bytes) 
 Baseline IconCache.db 181  2,149,246 
 
2.1 
Place DVD containing 1 
executable in D: drive
186 5 2,149,566 
 
2.2 
Install executable from 
DVD
192 6 2,150,096 




Exp Action Number of 
icons in file 
New icons 
added 





182  2,149,330 
 
3.1 
Insert clean memory  
stick  
184 2 2,149,454 
 
3.2 
Insert memory stick  
containing files only 
184 0 2,149,454 
3.4 Insert memory stick  
containing program 
executable 
183 2 2,149,374 
3.5 Run executable from 
memory stick 


























Appendix X a) 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Sample Baseline test results for  
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	
